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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
EFFECTS OF AGRICULTURAL LOANS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES – BENIN 
CASE STUDY 
 
Limited access to financial services is known as a major constraint to agricultural 
development (FAO, 2002). Farmers need liquidity to face agricultural expenses throughout 
the production cycle but mainly at the beginning. Mainstream financial institutions are 
reluctant to serve the agricultural sector for several reasons. First, they consider the sector 
to be highly risky with low performance. Also, agricultural activities depend on the 
weather, they take place in remote rural areas, and commodities prices are volatile. All 
these aspects make it hard for conventional banks to reach their profit goals when lending 
to farmers. Since microfinance was conceived, it has generated much hope for alleviating 
poverty in low-income countries. Microfinance provides the poor with access to affordable 
capital by granting low-income individuals with loans they would not otherwise have 
access to, because of economic and geographic constraints. 
The goal of the dissertation is to examine the role and the importance of microfinance 
in the agricultural sector of developing countries. A survey took place in October 2017, in 
both rural and urban areas of Benin and involved 750 agricultural households. Three 
different agricultural zones were selected: the North-East (cotton zone); the Center (tubers 
and cashew nut zone) and the South (a region with special crops such as vegetables, 
pineapple, palm tree, exotic plants). The study focuses on agricultural loans. It includes 
clients of the major microfinance institution in Benin: FECECAM - Faîtière des Caisses 
d’Epargne et de Crédit Agricole Mutuel.  
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. The study allows shedding 
light on the effects of agricultural loans, specifically, on households’ efficiency and labor 
employment, which are mostly overlooked in the microfinance literature. To overcome 
selection bias in microcredit evaluation, the research employs a pipeline design. Control 
and treatment groups consist of individuals who have chosen to participate in the 
microfinance program. The loan treatment considered is the experience with loans which 
includes program entry timing, loan take-up frequency, and the average amount of loan 
obtained over the 2012-2017 period. The study employs a cluster analysis technique to 
create reliable comparable groups. 
Multiple variables and indicators are analyzed. A descriptive analysis of loan impact 
on farmers’ labor input choices shows that past loans have residual effects on both hired 
and family labor use. Farm loans, especially those obtained for farm machinery 
significantly reduce expenditure on hired labor but more family labor is employed using 
machine loans while other loan categories reduced the use of family labor. The evaluation 
 
of the whole-farm efficiency of borrowers in the presence of agricultural loans reveals 
significant technical and allocative errors leading to profit loss in all studied regions. 
However, experience with loans significantly increases farmers’ whole-farm efficiency, 
particularly in the North. Finally, the assessment of well-being indicators suggests that 
those farm loans have a significant positive impact on sampled recipients’ net farm income, 
food security and food quality statuses. Agricultural loans also have a positive impact on 
women’s empowerment. The monitoring and implementation mechanism of FECECAM 
played a crucial role in the success of its loan programs. 
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Impact Evaluation, Pipeline Approach, Matching 
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 1 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation and objective 
Since microfinance was conceived, it has generated a lot of hope for alleviating 
poverty in low-income countries. Microfinance provides the poor with access to affordable 
capital by granting low-income individuals with loans they would not otherwise have 
access to, not only because of economic reasons but also because of geographic ones. 
Microfinance also covers a variety of other products and services such as micro-savings, 
microinsurance, transfers, leasing, as well as financial services training. 
Microfinance, and more specifically, microcredit programs, have been supported 
as sustainable interventions with the potential to alleviate poverty (Pankhurst and Johnston, 
1999). However, the literature reveals discrepancies between what microfinance ought to 
do, and what it actually does. More, evidence of the effectiveness of microfinance is still 
unclear. On the one hand, studies show that microfinance does help the poor improve their 
productivity or their well-being and enables them to pull out of poverty (Girabi and 
Mwakaje, 2013; Otero, 1999; Pitt and Khandker, 1998). On the other hand, other studies 
claim that evidence supporting the positive impact of microfinance interventions are thin 
and lack rigor (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan, 2014; Feder, Lau, Lin, and Luo, 
1990; Roodman and Morduch, 2014). 
The goal of this study is to examine the role and the importance of microfinance in the 
agricultural sector of developing countries. More specifically, the study aims at assessing 
the effects of agricultural loans on the rural world including farmers’ well-being, 
production efficiency as well as their labor and technology use in the context of Benin—
in West Africa. Benin has made significant progress in improving access to financial 
services over the past decades, and the country offers an interesting perspective for a 
research on the subject. For the most part, financial service access points in Benin are 
evenly distributed; there are no communes1 in the country that do not have at least one 
access point. Indeed, most communes have at least six financial service providers present, 
potentially indicating local competition (Brosnan, 2016). Moreover, Benin ranks among 
the tops in microfinance in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), 
                                                 
1 Communes are the second administrative territorial divisions in Benin and there are seventy-seven (77) 
communes in Benin. 
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with a substantial expansion of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) in various forms, both in 
rural and urban areas (Lélart, 2007). 
For the study, a survey took place in October 2017, in both rural and urban areas of 
Benin and involved 750 agricultural households. Three contrasting agricultural zones were 
selected: the North-East (cotton zone); the Center (tubers and cashew nut zone) and the 
South (zone with special crops such as vegetables, pineapple, palm tree, exotic plants). The 
study focuses on agricultural loans. It includes clients of the major microfinance institution 
in Benin: FECECAM - Faîtière des Caisses d’Epargne et de Crédit Agricole Mutuel. 
FECECAM was established in 1977 and represents as of 2017, more than 50%2 of the 
microloan supply in Benin. In its current form, FECECAM is a network of savings and 
credit cooperatives or rural banks with 136 branches throughout the country. The lender 
has a long tradition of micro and medium agricultural loans for small and medium-sized 
farms. The data, therefore, consist of a cross-section of both self-reported and data provided 
by FECECAM. 
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. The study allows shedding 
light on the effects of agricultural loans, specifically, on households’ efficiency and labor 
employment, which are mostly overlooked in the literature. More, this study is one of the 
first of the kind, to our knowledge, in the Benin context and will produce a unique dataset. 
The fieldwork and the data gathered represent a major contribution both to the research 
world and practitioners. In fact, to increase the funding of the agricultural sector, support 
is expected from public and private entities, Governments and donors. But for this, 
evidences of positive impacts of agricultural loans on farms and development objectives 
are needed, including poverty reduction, job creation, and food security. Thus, the study 
will inform on the merits of external support to farm credit. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follow. The first chapter introduces the 
context and justification of the study, presents the research design including the 
identification strategy, and provides a description of the sampled borrowers. The next 
chapter presents a descriptive analysis of how agricultural loans affect farm labor use by 
borrowers. The chapter relates credit availability to farmers’ labor input decisions, which 
                                                 
2 According to a speech of the Director of FECECAM in June 2017.  
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pertain both to direct and indirect expected impact of farm credit. It also examines the 
relation between labor and capital in the presence of farm loans. The third chapter of the 
dissertation assesses the effect of agricultural loans on input allocation decisions and farm 
profitability. It evaluates the impact of agricultural loans on the whole-farm efficiency of 
borrowers in Benin. The fourth chapter assesses the impact of agricultural loans on 
farmers’ well-being measured by their net farm income, nutritional and food security status 
as well as women’s empowerment in agriculture index for female borrowers. Finally, a 
general conclusion discusses the results of the dissertation and provide some 
recommendations to different actors of the credit sector.  
 
1.2.Background and literature review 
1.2.1.Microfinance: definition and approaches 
Microfinance is the provision of various financial services to the working poor. 
Microcredit provides working poor with access to affordable capital by granting them loans 
they would not otherwise have access to, because they do not meet both the economic and 
geographic requirements of mainstream banks. Microfinance also covers a variety of other 
products and services such as micro-savings, microinsurance, transfers, leasing, as well as 
financial services training. This study focuses on microcredit and assesses its effect on 
agricultural households. 
Two divergent approaches dominate the current debates in the microfinance field: 
the commercial approach or financial system approach and the poverty lending approach. 
The commercial approach, which has a strong neoliberal groundwork, targets the 
economically active poor–those with skills and earning capacity–and not the ultra-poor. 
This approach is based on full cost-recovery, institutional self-sustainability and demand-
driven outreach principles (Batra, 2010). In contrast, the poverty lending approach, which 
is the dominant paradigm in developing countries, targets the extremely poor to help them 
out of poverty and gain empowerment. Under this approach, loans at below-market interest 
rates are provided to the poor with funds from donors or governments. Even though the 
approaches emphasize different aspects–on entrepreneurship and growth for the former, 
and on poverty alleviation and empowerment for the latter–there is evidence that both 
approaches contribute to the development of institutional microfinance (Batra, 2010). The 
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studied lender is a microfinance cooperative, which predominantly uses the financial 
system approach. Though FECECAM has to cover its cost by ensuring financial 
sustainability, the cooperative has a social component in its portfolio with very small loans 
offered especially to poor women who benefit from group lending. These group loans come 
with training and education on various aspects such as health, nutrition, and finance. 
 
1.2.2.Microfinance challenges  
In general, the microfinance sector face several challenges. One of the major challenges 
faced by the sector resides in the fact that clients are hard to evaluate in terms of risk and 
often costly to serve (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). First, low-income 
households, typically excluded from the formal banking system, lack collateral that a 
financial institution needs in case of default. Second, mainstream banks tend to locate in 
urban centers while most of the poor in developing world live in rural areas. Consequently, 
the administrative costs of serving these rural clients are very high making it less profitable 
(Ellrich and Sarges, 2010). The fixed cost of lending is therefore too high for small loans, 
especially in rural areas. Third, creditors do not have complete information about the 
borrowers. Either adverse selection occurs and banks cannot easily determine riskier 
customers from safer and charge them accordingly, and/or moral hazard arises and lenders 
are unable to ensure that customers are doing their best to make their investment projects 
successful. In developing countries, weak judicial systems worsen these problems because 
of the difficulty to enforce contracts (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005).  
Several mechanisms have been developed to cope with these challenges. A standard 
tool used involves requiring borrowers to apply for credit in voluntarily formed groups: 
assuming that borrowers have better information about each other and will avoid higher 
risk members (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). The key feature of group 
lending is the so-called joint liability (Stiglitz, 1990). According to this principle, all group 
members are treated as being in default if a single member does not repay his loan. This 
model was first used by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. In Benin, microfinance 
institutions usually rely on group-based guarantees and women-led microcredits to cope 
with the information asymmetry and the lack of collateral. However, while this promoted 
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the expansion at the early stage, it also contributed to the prevalence of unauthorized MFIs 
(Cui, Dieterich, and Maino, 2016). 
Several scholars point out the benefits of group lending (Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2000; Godquin, 2004; Gomez and Santor, 2003; Guttman, 2007). For instance, 
group meetings, through education and training, help clients with little experience improve 
the financial performance of their businesses (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000). 
Group lending plays a key role in mitigating risks associated with information asymmetry 
(Godquin, 2004). Because group borrowers are jointly liable, they have the incentive to 
monitor each other especially when one of them switches to a riskier project (moral 
hazard). Therefore, peer pressure and social ties help reduce group members’ default 
(Guttman, 2007). For instance, utilizing data from two North American microfinance 
institutions, Gomez and Santor (2003) find evidence that those enrolled in group loans 
programs outperform individual borrowers in terms of default probabilities. They attribute 
that effect to the dual channels of sorting and incentives for greater effort once inside the 
group. 
However, there are negative aspects to introducing group lending (Armendáriz de 
Aghion and Morduch, 2000; Besley and Coate, 1995; Kodongo and Kendi, 2013; Shankar, 
2007). Group lending is often associated with additional costs such as group formation 
costs, training costs of borrowers on group procedures, supervision and a higher frequency 
of installment payments. The fact that all group members are penalized because of one or 
few members represent an unappealing trait of group lending. Furthermore, merely 
gathering good information does not guarantee contract enforcement or prevent strategic 
default. Even when loan officers collect the necessary information before and after the loan 
is given, they still face the problem of enforcing debt repayments once borrowers get their 
investment’ returns. To circumvent the enforcement issue, most MFIs rely on dynamic 
incentives; that is, good borrowers receive larger loans over time and defaulting ones incur 
the risk of not receiving any more loans (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000). 
 
1.2.3.Microfinance and risk management 
Farmers in developing countries also face significant risk constraints along with capital 
constraints. If lack of access to credit can limit farmers’ investment in activities with higher 
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profits, lack of access to formal insurance market can also prevent farmers from investing 
in activities that may be risky but have high expected returns (Cai, Chen, Fang, and Zhou, 
2015; Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto, and Udry, 2014).  
Karlan et al. (2014) reported that farmers in northern Ghana most often cite lack of 
capital as the reason why they have low farm investment, but they also understand the risk 
of unpredictable rainfall and claim to reduce their farm investment because of it. The results 
of their study show that capital constraints alone are not the problem but risk represents a 
key hindrance to investment. The study concludes that the binding constraint to farmer 
investment is uninsured risk as farmers are able to find resources to increase expenditure 
on their farms when provided with insurance against the main catastrophic risk they face.  
Microcredit networks and infrastructure could be used to construct better risk-
management tools. Although there has been some attempt at this, it has traditionally been 
life insurance, not rainfall or a form of agricultural insurance (Karlan et al., 2014). Using 
the first large-scale randomized experimental evidence of the effect of micro-insurance on 
farmer production behavior, Cai et al. (2015) showed that micro-insurance may be as 
important as microfinance in poverty alleviation, and that micro-insurance can supplement 
and strengthen the effects of microfinance by protection the farmers from the inherent risk 
of entrepreneurial activities.  
For developing countries, agricultural insurance is not the “miracle solution” but it has 
the potential to contribute to the development of more intensive and productive agricultural 
systems by managing residual risks and securing income and credit programs. In western 
African counties, crop insurances started very recently with the development of index 
based crop insurance pilot projects in Mali and Burkina Faso (cotton, maize), Benin 
(maize), and Senegal (groundnut, maize) (Muller et al., 2013). In those countries, the index 
insurance pilot project covers farmers against rainfall deficit in order to protect them 
against drought but also to protect financial institutions against the risk of default of their 
borrowers.  
In Benin, a local agricultural insurance institution has been created in 2007 to help farm 
households cope with risk: the Agriculture Mutual Insurance of Benin (Assurance Mutuelle 
Agricole du Bénin - AMAB). Besides the index insurance project for maize, AMAB offers 
other products such as multi-risk harvest insurance, livestock mortality insurance, 
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agricultural facilities and warehouse insurance, health insurance (hospitalization) for 
farmers, to name a few. 
 
1.2.4.History of microfinance in Benin 
The Republic of Benin is a small country in West Africa located between Nigeria and 
Togo. Its total area is 112,622 sq km (43483.58 sq mi). As of 2015, Benin has an estimated 
population of 10.9 million inhabitants. During the 2011-2015 period, Benin's real gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth increased from 4.6% in 2012 to 6.5% in 2014 and was 
among the best in WAEMU countries (The World Bank, 2016). However, poverty remains 
widespread and even rising in the country. In 2007, the national poverty rate in Benin is 
estimated at 32.2% for the monetary poverty and 39.6% for the non-monetary incidence of 
poverty (INSAE, 2009). According to The World Bank (2016), this rate rose to 40.1% in 
2015. 
Benin’s experience with microfinance started in 1977, when a network of local farm 
co-operatives, Caisses Locales de Crédit Agricole Mutuel (CLCAM3)) was created along 
with the national farm credit bank (Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole (CNCA)). The 
initial goal of the CNCA was to provide savings and credit services to farmers, government 
workers as well as business owners. The emergence of microfinance organizations as we 
know them today in Benin is a more recent phenomenon, the result of a series of events. 
First, in the mid-1980s, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU or 
Union) countries, including Benin, faced a severe economic and social crisis. Benin 
experienced the bankruptcy of its banking system and the subsequent closure of all state 
banks4 which led to a lack of funding sources for all key sectors of the economy 
(Adechoubou, 1996). It is believed that the financial crisis resulted from excessive 
government intervention in the financial system. Consequently, in the early 1990s, the 
government undertook a series of reforms to create strict regulatory frameworks to support 
the emergence of a competitive private financial sector (Joseph, 2002). The government 
also pulled out of most state-owned enterprises. 
                                                 
3 Local farm co-operatives (CLCAM) were overseen by the national farm co-operatives’ network of Benin 
which is FECECAM (Faitières des caisses d’Epargne et de Crédit Agricole Mutuel du Bénin) in its old form. 
4 These include the CNCA in 1987, the Benin Bank for Development in 1989 and the Commercial Bank of 
Benin in 1990.  
 8 
This withdrawal of the government facilitated the emergence of many micro-
enterprises, most of them in the informal sector, whose financing needs were not taken into 
account by the formal financial sector in reconstruction. The WAEMU authorities, with 
the support of International Development Cooperation Agency (CID), therefore committed 
to broadening the financial landscape of the Union by promoting MFIs,5 which are 
designed to meet the diverse financial needs of the population. In Benin, as in the whole 
Union, the microfinance sector is, therefore, regulated by a law called the PARMEC6 Act. 
With this act, savings and credit unions, as well as cooperatives, can be approved and their 
local affiliates officially recognized by the respective Ministries of Finance of the member 
states. Since its adoption in 1993, the PARMEC Act has been a major tool for the 
development of the microfinance sector in West Africa by securing the collection of 
savings, helping to control credit management and contributing to the professionalization 
of MFIs (PNUD-Bénin, 2007). In 2012, Benin updated the PARMEC Act. Thus, in Benin, 
the operation of MFIs is now governed by the 2012 Act regulating MFIs. 
As of June 30, 2017, the Ministry of Economy and Finance reported 98 registered MFIs 
operating in Benin with 639 service locations throughout the country (MEF, 2017). 
However, several other MFIs operate illegally in the country and including them brings the 
number of service points in the country up to 800 (PLURIEX, 2011). During the period 
2005 to 2015, the number of clients collectively served by MFIs increased from 687,000 
to 1,825,000. These figures reflect the rapid growth of MFIs in Benin even if a significant 
segment of the population remains excluded from financial services. Figure 1.1 shows the 
evolution of the number of clients over time. 
As mentioned above, 78% of MFIs in Benin offer both credit and voluntary savings 
opportunities to their clients. The amount of deposit has exponentially increased over the 
last ten years. In 2005, clients’ deposits amounted 39.8 billion FCFA7 while in 2015 
deposits were about 93.5 billion FCFA. Over the same ten years’ period, 74.2 billion FCFA 
                                                 
5 In Benin, MFIs are called decentralized financial systems (systèmes financiers décentralisés (SFD)). 
FECECAM is a classical MFI with a greater regulatory oversight.  
6 PARMEC stands for Projet d’Appui à la Réglementation des Mutuelles et Cooperatives d’Epargne et de 
Crédit (Project to support the regulation of savings and credit unions and cooperatives) 
7 1 USD  540 FCFA 
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of credit were disbursed by MFIs in 2005 and 124.03 billion FCFA in 2015 (MEF, 2016). 
Figure 1.2 shows the amount deposited at MFIs over time in Benin 
 
1.2.5. Types of microfinance institutions in Benin 
There are several types of service providers in the microfinance sector in Benin. We 
can classify microfinance institutions in terms of their mode of operation or their legal 
status. In terms of legal status, two main categories exist:  
- Unions and cooperatives of savings and credit: these are institutions incorporated 
and licensed to provide microfinance services. 
- Institutions non-incorporated as unions or cooperatives of savings and credit. These 
institutions have their own legal status but also engage in microfinance activities. 
However, these institutions are required to sign an agreement with the Ministry of 
Finance which monitors their microfinance activities. Non-governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), Microfinance companies (for-profit), and governmental programs or projects 
are in this category.  
When one considers the mode of operation, MFIs can be grouped into three main 
categories (Amouzou, 2008; PNUD-Bénin, 2007). 
- Credit and savings institutions: they offer both credit products and voluntary 
savings. This type of institution includes unions and cooperatives as well as savings and 
credit groups. According to the 2005 MFI census8, they represent 78% of the 
microfinance institutions inventoried. 
- Credit-only non-deposit taking institutions only grant credits, either from their own 
credit lines or foreign partners. This category encompasses most associations and 
microfinance companies. They represent about 18% of the MFI.  
Organizations and projects with a microfinance component: they include non-
governmental organizations (microfinance NGOs) as well as government initiatives. 
Programs of this kind operate either through direct credits to the population, or refinance 
other MFIs. Microfinance projects account for approximately 3% of microfinance 
initiatives at the national level. 
                                                 
8 Inventory done by the Microfinance Unit of the Ministry of Economy and Finance in 2005 
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1.3. Presentation of the studied lender and its products 
1.3.1.Why FECECAM? 
Established in 1977, FECECAM is the largest microlender in Benin and represents 
more than 50%9 of the microloan supply in the country. In its current structure, FECECAM 
is a network of savings and credit cooperatives that has the highest geographical coverage 
with its 136 branches throughout the country. It has a long tradition of small and medium-
sized loans for farmers and agricultural businesses. FECECAM has been through multiple 
crises over the years that led the network to neglect the agricultural credit line in past 
decades for both internal and external reasons. The Federal German Ministry of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), through the German Financial Cooperation (KfW), 
recently refinanced FECECAM with the aim of supporting rural credit in general and 
agricultural credit in particular. At the same time, through its technical branch of 
Cooperation (GIZ), the BMZ also finances technical support to farmers to facilitate their 
applying for, using, and repaying loans. In addition, the GIZ supports several agricultural 
commodity chains in Benin that it has identified as being under served by credit 
organizations. This is the main impetus behind the GIZ supporting financial institutions 
that specifically serve agriculture. This study has been commissioned and funded by the 
KfW. 
 
1.3.2. Loan products 
The refinancing and support from the German government enabled FECECAM to 
renew its focus on farm loans. In 2017, the cooperative included more than 1.5 million 
members and nearly 400,000 borrowers, with agricultural loans representing 20% of the 
total amount of loan disbursed (77,000 agricultural borrowers).  
FECECAM offers a fairly large range of credit types and repayment options to meet 
the diverse needs of both rural and urban clients. Credit types vary from short term (6 to 
12 months) to long-term loans. The lender offers both individual and group loans of 
variable sizes to its agricultural clients. In fact, the MFI offers different type of loans for 
                                                 
9 According to a speech of the Director of FECECAM in June 2017. 
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different agricultural activities or periods. For example, FECECAM offers loans for inputs 
purchase, planting, harvest, storage costs, as well as for warrantage10. Even the repayment 
options for agricultural loans are tailored to the cycle of the crop or the activity. 
Table 1.1 summarizes the different types of agricultural loans. Note that the sample 
includes all loan products listed in the table. 
FECECAM requires its clients to reside in the commune of the service point where 
they apply for a loan. Since FECECAM is a cooperative, it requires loan applicants to pay 
a one-time membership fee of 500 FCFA (0.90 USD). Loan applicants must also provide 
a member share of 1,000 FCFA. Applicants must also pay a 1,000 FCFA deposit fee for 
every 50,000 FCFA borrowed, but these deposits count toward repayment. In most cases, 
applicants must be members of FECECAM for at least three months prior to applying for 
a loan. They must also have a minimum savings of 20% of the amount requested. Only 
small size loans offered in groups are exempt11 from these rules.  
Additional loan amounts can be requested only if borrowers have repaid any 
previous loans, with the exception of farm loans obtained for specific agricultural activities; 
for example, a loan for planting can be followed by a loan for harvest even if the former 
loan is not fully repaid. 
Generally, any amount of loan requested at FECECAM requires a (financial) 
collateral of 15% to 20% of the amount requested, depending on the service point. This 
requirement is in addition to the required minimum account balance mentioned above. 
FECECAM only requires asset collateral (e.g., land titles and other assets) for individual 
loans above 400,000 FCFA. In case of group loans, joint liability serves as the guarantee. 
Some loans products come with technical support or training. For instance, with a 
product such the agricultural loan for rural women – CAFER (Crédit Agricole aux Femmes 
Rurales), women receive training in areas such as health, education, and production. A 
group facilitator and loan agent appointed by FECECAM regularly meets with the loan 
                                                 
10 The “warrantage” or inventory credit system allows farmers to use their harvest as collateral to obtain a 
loan rather than selling it at one at harvest, when prices are often low. This system was used by European 
farmers in the 19th century.  
11 Though, the one-time membership fee of 500 FCFA is paid by the group as a whole, not by the members 
individually. 
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recipients to supervised and train them. She also collects the repayment installments when 
they are due.  
Overall, FECECAM agricultural credit program resembles a supervised credit 
program. In a supervised agricultural credit scheme, farmers receive credit in the form of 
an integrated package of financial support, technical guidance, as well as some inputs 
supply. More details about supervised credit programs can be found in Brake (1974) and 
Mohsin, Ahmad, and Anwar (2011). Before FECECAM’s approval, the farmer and the 
credit agent make a farm (business) plan as well as a home plan. The home plan includes 
average monthly expenditures and forecasted changes during the loan cycle. The farm plan 
focuses on the operation to fund but also includes other farm activities that may generate 
income or benefit the funded activities. Through the plan, farmers are directed and advised. 
Certain commodities are promoted for their local economic potential and others are 
discouraged or disapproved12. The supervised component of FECECAM credit program is 
discussed further in the dissertation.  
As Figure 1.3 shows, over our six-year study period, credit applications consistently 
peak around the month of June. This is because the agricultural season, or the rainy season, 
in all regions of the country starts around that period. 
 
1.4. Survey design 
1.4.1.Survey area, data collection, and data 
The core of the dissertation is a survey of FECECAM agricultural borrowers in three 
agricultural zones13 in Benin. Not having the means to cover all agricultural zones in Benin, 
three contrasting agricultural zones were chosen: the North-East (cotton zone); the Central 
(tubers and cashew nut zone); and South (zone with specialty crops such as vegetables, 
pineapple, palm tree, and ornamental plants). The survey was conducted in 30 FECECAM 
service points, covering 48 of the 77 communes of the country. On average, respondents 
                                                 
12 For instance, in Benin the sale of adulterated gasoline is a common activity, even though forbidden. 
FECECAM does not fund such activities. 
13 The Ministry of Agriculture of Benin had divided the country into seven different agricultural zones based 
on their agro-ecology and their potential in terms of commodities chain development. These zones have been 
called pôles de développement agricole (agricultural development poles). 
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live 25 km (16 miles) from their service points. Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of 
respondents and sampled services points. 
The fieldwork took place in October 2017 and collected information about the 2016-
2017 agricultural season. The data collection concerned several aspects of the borrowers’ 
life and activities. The questionnaire comprises ten key modules. The first module collects 
information about the borrower’s identification and socio-economic characteristics such as 
age, sex, status in their household, educational level, activities conducted and their 
contribution to the respondents’ income over the studied period. The second module 
enquires about sampled borrowers’ household composition as well as the time use of each 
household member during the 2016-2017 agricultural season. Time use information 
concerns mainly the time allocated to own productive activities as well as the time spent 
working on the borrower’s farm or other household member’s farm. The third module 
investigates the credit history of the respondents asking information such as the loan 
obtained from FECECAM and other MFI, when they were obtained, the respective amount 
of the loans, the funded activities, etc. It then focuses on details about the latest loan 
obtained from FECECAM and its terms as well as its utilization. That module also collect 
data on clients’ satisfaction of FECECAM’s loan program. The fourth module of the survey 
questionnaire is about crop production inputs and outputs costs and quantities. The module 
also includes land availability and land tenure. The fifth module contains information about 
inputs and outputs costs and quantities of trade and processing activities. Next, the same 
type of information is collected for livestock and animal husbandry. Other types of income 
generating activities output and expenses are captured in a separate module. Labor use 
during the studied agricultural season is the subject of a separate module. The module’s 
questions are related to the labor type, labor quantity, work time, pay and type of contract, 
geographical origin of workers among other questions. The ninth module enquires about 
sampled borrowers’ assets type and values (household durable goods and productive asset). 
The tenth module helps uncover borrowers’ household food security and nutritional 
statuses as well as lean season information and coping mechanism. Note that these 
questions are asked to female borrowers directly or spouses in case when the sampled 
respondent is male. Finally, the survey closes with questions about sampled respondents’ 
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perception of the impact of FECECAM loans on their activities as well as key outcome 
variables. 
Overall, the dissertation draws upon three sources of data: a questionnaire-based 
survey of the sampled FECECAM clients, secondary data drawn from the FECECAM’s 
database of agricultural borrowers, and a set of focus group discussions with the staff in 
the local branches.  
 
1.4.2.Survey design 
Identification and estimation of the effects of microcredit participation are difficult 
because of two levels of selection: self-selection into a microfinance program by the 
households, and the screening process of MFIs. To address these biases, this study employs 
the so-called pipeline design, which is typically used in cross-sectional setting in the 
absence of fully randomized experiments. This approach is justified by the fact that both 
its control and treatment groups consist of individuals who have chosen to participate in 
the microfinance program, addressing these two major sources of selection bias.  
The sample was drawn from the FECECAM borrowers’ database. First, the population 
of interest was narrowed down to individuals who borrowed from FECECAM for 
agricultural reasons from 2012 to 2017. This group includes borrowers who took a loan for 
crop production, animal husbandry, the processing of agricultural products, and trade in 
agricultural commodities. Then, a two-stage sampling approach was followed, with 
representative geographical areas selected in the first stage, and random sampling of 
FECECAM clients in the second stage. In the first stage, three agricultural zones (strata) 
were chosen and, from each zone, ten FECECAM branches (clusters) were drawn with a 
probability proportional to its size (in terms of agricultural clientele), resulting in 30 
branches being selected out of 93 in total. Finally, 26 borrowers, with 13 being “new” and 
13 being “old” were randomly selected per FECECAM branch. Clients were considered 
“old” if they had entered FECECAM loan program at least three years before the survey 
and “new” if they had entered within the year prior the survey. 
In total, 780 agricultural borrowers were sampled. However, issues encountered 
during the data collection changed the ultimate ratio between old and new clients, and 
reduced the sample size. First, several new clients who had yet to repay their loans confused 
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the survey with a loan recovery mission. Many were reluctant to be interviewed and in 
some cases refused completely. Also, the data collection revealed that some borrowers 
from the initial sampling list had never taken agricultural loans, especially in the branches 
located in the South14. In some extreme cases, it was not even possible to reach the 26 
agricultural borrowers targeted per branch. Either this was due to errors in the coding of 
their files during the application, or some loan agents purposely mis-categorized some 
clients’ files so that the client could benefit from the relatively laxer terms15 of some of the 
agricultural loan products. Ultimately, the study sample comprised 748 usable 
observations, with the composition being 29% new loan recipients (entered in 2016 and 
2017) and 71% old borrowers. Figure 1.5 shows the number of agricultural loan recipients 
between 2012 and 2017 in the population and in the sample by studied region.  
 
1.5. Impact assessment approach 
1.5.1.Brief notes on microfinance studies history 
Key themes in microfinance research are asymmetric information and transaction 
costs present in imperfect rural credit markets (Marr, 2012). The concept of joint liability 
discussed above is the most studied aspect of several theoretical models. In spite of their 
usefulness, these theoretical models provide little knowledge about the impact that 
microfinance might have on its users as well various changes induced. Therefore, a second 
tradition in microfinance started dealing with the issue of impact on clients. In the process, 
researchers gradually shifted the focus from analyzing impacts on the microfinance-funded 
enterprise alone, to including changes at the household and individual levels (assuming 
non-separability between households’ production and consumption functions), to the study 
of intra-household dynamics and gender empowerment, to looking at specific socio-
economic impacts such as employment, technology, child nutrition and food security and 
to studying wider community impacts (Marr, 2012). 
 
                                                 
14 The South is a more urban area where agricultural activities are not as predominant compared to the other 
areas. 
15 FECECAM usually requires loan applicants to maintain a saving account with the cooperative for at least 
three months before applying for a loan. However, that condition is not enforced in case of agricultural loans. 
Also, most agricultural loans below a certain amount do not require collateral.  
 16 
1.5.2.Issues in identifying causal effects of microloans 
Determining causality in microfinance studies is challenging. The assessment of the 
impact of a microloan program amounts to gauging how the program affected the 
participants and changed their lives. The issue with microcredit evaluation is that, once a 
person or a household makes the decision to participate in a loan program, it becomes 
impossible to know how their lives might have evolved without that loan. In other words, 
the biggest challenge in microfinance program evaluation is finding the counterfactual 
(Odell, 2015). A reflexive attempt is the use of non-borrowers. However, this is 
problematic because those who self-select into a loan program could be fundamentally 
different from those who never seek to borrow. If these distinguishing characteristics 
systematically affect the outcome variables, there is selection bias. Factors such as 
management and entrepreneurial abilities, risk preferences, resourcefulness, and 
trustworthiness—which are hard to measure–could explain differences between borrowers 
and non-borrowers. In addition, factors such as own financial constraints, assets, or 
technology use could also differentiate borrowers from non-borrowers. In fact, it could be 
that those with greater assets or those with a bigger operation (higher levels of inputs use 
and outputs) are the ones that get loans; or that the use of loans actually improves 
productivity. The location of the ‘treatment’ itself could also explain differences between 
borrowers and non-borrowers, as MFIs typically choose to locate themselves in accessible 
areas or places with higher economic potential. On top of this, loan providers use 
systematic loan-worthiness-screening criteria that distinguish clients from non-clients. Any 
estimation of loan effects in the presence of these issues of self-selection and/or 
endogenous program placement will yield biased parameter estimates. Thus, any 
evaluation of a microfinance program must use different methods to come up with a 
reliable estimate of the counterfactual. 
For these reasons, in many settings, treatment effects estimated from Randomized 
Control Trials (RCT) are considered the gold standard. With an RCT, loans would be 
randomly assigned to some study participants (the treatment group) and not to others (the 
control group), or loan services would be offered to some randomly-assigned communities, 
and not to others. The fact that study participants are randomly assigned to one group or 
another eliminates any systematic differences between the two groups and thus, any 
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observed differences in measured outcomes between the two groups can be attributed to 
the credit or the treatment assigned. However, there are some criticisms about RTC and the 
broader validity of their results is not yet guaranteed (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and 
Kinnan, 2014; Karlan and Zinman, 2011). RCT are expensive to conduct and are often 
criticized for studying impact over a relatively short duration. More germane to this study, 
researchers argue that most RCT studies are conducted in areas where considerable 
microfinance lending already exists (Rajbanshi, Huang, and Wydick, 2015). Results from 
such studies should then not be generalized as the average impact of microfinance. 
However, studies such as Crépon, Devoto, Duflo, and Parienté (2015) and Rajbanshi et al. 
(2015) represent some of the first efforts to study the impact of microfinance in an area 
where no MFI was previously operating. 
This study uses a quasi-experimental approach. In these studies, strategies are used by 
researchers to come up with a reliable control group without the use of random assignment. 
A widely used technique in quasi-experimental studies is the so-called “pipeline design”. 
This design compares a representative sample drawn from the population that has received 
‘treatment’ with a sample drawn from a comparable population that is about to receive it 
for the first time (i.e., the pipeline group) (Coleman, 1999, 2006; Copestake, Bhalotra, & 
Johnson, 2001; Marr, 2012). The difficulty with the pipeline approach is that pipeline 
groups used as proxy for control groups could still introduce some bias to the estimates. 
However, it is considered to be an adequate alternative in cases where RCTs are not 
feasible. 
In this instance, the pipeline design is used in a cross-sectional setting, where old16 MFI 
clients are used as the treatment group and new entrants as the control group. This approach 
is justified by the fact that both its treatment and comparison groups consist of individuals 
who have chosen to participate in the microfinance program, consequently addressing the 
largest sources of selection bias. Nonetheless, it makes the estimates vulnerable to other 
problems such as “attrition bias” caused by those who drop out of the treatment (Karlan, 
2001; Karlan and Tedeschi, 2010). The performance of old borrowers may exceed that of 
new borrowers because of unobserved qualities in old borrowers that have allowed them 
                                                 
16 This approach has been developed by the Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services (AIMS) of the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to assess impact. 
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to remain in the program. As a solution, Karlan (2001) suggests altering the veteran group 
to include those who drop out. The authors argue that this small correction can significantly 
improve the accuracy and therefore the reliability of the results. 
 
1.5.3.Identification strategy 
This research is based on data from a survey of FECECAM agricultural borrowers 
conducted in October 2017.The survey focuses on recipients who have been borrowing 
from the MFI for agricultural related reasons, at least since 2012. The sample includes 
some borrowers who had entered the program even before 2012 and borrowers who joined 
FECECAM from 2012 to 2017 (Table 1.2). By construction, the dataset retains all 
‘dropouts;’ among the sampled clients, some have stayed ever since their entry and have 
taken loans multiple times (during several years) while others have dropped out after one 
or few loans. Over the six-year study period, the sampled borrowers have taken loans on 
average 3.11 (1.75) times. For example, among participants who entered the program in 
2012 and 2013 there are, respectively, 1.39% and 5.75% who borrowed only during one 
year, 11.11% and 4.60% who borrowed during two years, 15.28% and 14.94% who 
borrowed from FECECAM during three years. Over this period, FECECAM has had a 
fairly stable operation and no new service point was opened. From a statistical point of 
view, this is fortunate as the propensity to enter did not change and new clients make a 
good comparison group for older ones, holding everything else constant. 
Figure 1.6 presents the number of years during which the participants took loans, after 
their entry in the program. 
This variation in the actual lending period or frequency of borrowing, allowed by 
the relatively long period considered, introduces a complication into dividing the sample 
into old and new clients just based on the time of entry as done by previous studies that 
used the cohort approach. In fact, as confirmed by figure 5, not all early clients borrowed 
for long. Put differently, not all early clients have the same experience with FECECAM 
credit program. In fact, participants have borrowed variable amounts between 2012 and 
2017, and they have also borrowed several times, even within a year. In this context, 
program entry timing cannot solely determine the experience with loan from 2012 to 2017, 
which is the loan treatment here. An early entry increases participants’ likelihood to be 
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experienced as they are more exposed, but it does not exclusively determine their 
experience with loans. 
A better definition of participants experience with loans would involve (i) the time 
since the first loan, which captures seniority, (ii) the number of loans received, to capture 
regularity, and (iii) the average amount of credit obtained over the period in question, to 
apprehend intensity. Therefore, the loan treatment in this study is captured using a 
combination of program entry timing, cumulative loan amounts, and the number of loans 
taken between 2012 and 2017. However it is measured, the effect of loans on a household 
is expected to build over time. For experienced clients, benefits from loan program 
participation would have already accrued over a certain period, say six years, while 
inexperienced clients would see little to no benefit depending on the time between their 
loan receipt and the reference period. The appropriateness of this approach rests on the 
absence of systematic differences between experienced and inexperienced borrowers. 
Consequently, differences in studied outcome variables between the two groups of clients 
can be attributed to credit, after controlling for factors such as demographics and 
environment. 
Survey respondents received loans from other sources as well. However, only 5.2% 
of the respondents took additional loans from other formal MFIs during the period 
considered, while the majority, 94.6% of respondents, received loans exclusively from 
FECECAM, and 0.2% of the respondents took additional loans from informal sources such 
as moneylenders, relatives and friends. Thus, while the average loan size includes amounts 
received from other formal MFI during the considered period,17 the loan effect is 
effectively the FECECAM agricultural loan effect. 
On average, respondents have joined FECECAM 5.58 years prior to the survey. 
They have obtained a loan three times already and have borrowed a total amount of 
1,727,400 FCFA on average between January 2012 and October 2017. For a better 
grouping and description of the sample based on the loan treatment, a k-means cluster 
analysis is performed. Cluster analysis is an exploratory data-analysis technique which uses 
                                                 
17 In their review of 11 studies on credit studies, Gaile and Foster (1996) have pointed out the lack of 
including or mentioning the presence or absence of possibly competing financial institutions in the studied 
areas.  
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an algorithm to determine the natural groupings (or clusters) of observations. In this 
specific case, the k-means clustering defines groups by minimizing the heterogeneity of 
individuals within those groups. The number of (non-overlapping) groups to be created is 
specified by the user. For a more detailed description of the algorithm, the reader is directed 
to Makles (2012). 
Table 1.3 summarizes the results of the k-means cluster analysis. We specify two 
groups, with the expectation that this would divide the sample into experienced borrowers 
and inexperienced borrowers. The first group includes borrowers, who, on average from 
2012 to 2017, have joined FECECAM 15 years prior to the study, have taken a loan four 
times and have received an average of 1,126,000 FCFA of loan each time. The second 
group consists of borrowers, who, on average, entered the loan program only three years 
before the study, have taken two to three loans, and have received an average amount of 
300,000 FCFA of loan each time they have borrowed. Indeed, we can call the first group 
the experienced borrowers while the second cluster can be called the inexperienced 
borrowers. 
One can argue now that there is less heterogeneity within each group in comparison. 
Looking at characteristics other than those listed in table 1.3 for each of the two groups 
confirms that there are no critical differences between the two groups (Table 1.4). 
Experienced participants seem to be “an older version’’ of the inexperienced ones. In fact, 
experienced borrowers are older, therefore, they are mostly household heads, they have 
bigger household size, and they have been conducting their autonomous activities for 
longer. In addition, inexperienced borrowers seem to live farther from FECECAM service 
points than the experienced ones, which indicates that FECECAM is reaching farmers in 
remote areas as well. Admittedly, experienced borrowers are more educated than 
inexperienced ones. Nevertheless, no variable indicates critical differences between the 
two groups. Most differences are age-related. Matching methods will help eliminate these 
minor dissimilarities between the two groups, in order to estimate the causal effect of loan 
experience.  
 
 21 
1.6. Description of the sample and summary statistics 
1.6.1.Respondents’ characteristics 
Age and gender 
Table 1.5. summarizes the proportion of male and female respondents as well as 
their average age by region. On average, sampled borrowers are 44 years old. This average 
age is consistent across gender and regions.  
 The sample includes 32.22 % of female borrowers and 67.78 % of male. The Center 
has the highest proportion of female respondents (40.64%). The lowest percentage of 
female borrowers is in the South, and this is partly explained by socio-cultural differences. 
In the South, women are less involved in agricultural activities. Also, para -agricultural 
activities such petty trade and processing of agricultural commodities in which women are 
mostly involved in this area is relatively less funded by agricultural lenders.  
 
Education 
 Respondents level of education is measured using their years of schooling, which 
is the total number of years passing to the next grade level. The average number of years 
of schooling is low (see figure 1.7). It increases from the North to the South and male 
recipients are more educated than female recipients. On average, the respondents have not 
finished their primary school. It’s only in the South that a substantial proportion of 
recipients have finished at least primary education. 
 Education level was also assessed using respondents’ ability to communicate in 
French18. In fact, even though loan agents can speak the local languages, loan application 
documents as well as all administrative paperwork are written in French. Therefore, 
proficiency in French (speaking at least) is important. Yet, only 19.54% of the recipients 
can easily communicate in French. The South has the highest proportion of borrowers with 
good proficiency in French speaking while the North has the lowest rate. This confirms the 
finding (figure 1.7) that respondents in the South are more educated compared to other 
regions. There are twice less women fluent in French as men (11.76% versus 23.21%). 
                                                 
18 French is the official language of Benin. 
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These factors can affect recipients’ ability to properly benefit from or manage their loan, 
and can also create a dependency on loan agents. 
In the absence of school education, many rural people acquire varied experiences 
by temporarily migrating. In some ethnic groups, this is almost a rite of passage into 
adulthood (in the North-West in particular). Labor migration, in addition to the transfers it 
allows to poor communities and households, represents an opportunity for exchanges of 
agricultural and non-agricultural knowledge. 33.73% of borrowers have experienced labor 
migration; men more than women (39.53% versus 21.25%). Most male recipients migrate 
to work in agriculture in neighboring countries (Nigeria) while females migrate within the 
country especially in urban areas to work as housekeepers and maids. These are medium-
term migrations which last on average 12.31months for men and 6.66months for women. 
Respondents’ perceptions on the impact of these migration experiences on their current 
economic activities are mixed, but never negative. Some feel that they have learned new 
farming techniques while others have acquired a sense of business, entrepreneurship, and 
management. 
 
1.6.2.Respondents’ household characteristics 
Respondents’ households count on average 9.37members in the North, 7.8 in the 
Center, and 7.00 members in the South. Using the FAO adult equivalent19 scale, the 
household sizes in terms of adult-mouths-to-feed are respectively 8.08 adult equivalents in 
the North, 6.65 in the Center, and 6.11 adult equivalents in the South. Given the average 
age of the borrowers, they belong to households with a high proportion of adults and young 
people and relatively few children, resulting in a large number of adult equivalent 
consumers.  
Northern respondents have the largest household. In addition, household 
organization in the North is slightly different than the other studied regions. For instance, 
most households in the North maintain a traditional organization of a single shared 
                                                 
19FAO coefficients are applied to household members’ age to convert household sizes into adult equivalent 
consumers. These coefficients are: 0.4 for children under 5, 0.7 for 6-10 years old, 1 for 16-50 year olds, 0.8 
for the 56-65 age group and 0.8 for those over 65 years. Since rural women are responsible for a large number 
of activities requiring sustained physical activity and often being pregnant or breastfeeding, no additional 
coefficient has been applied to their physiological needs and to their conversion rate in adult equivalent. 
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“kitchen” where all wives cook for the entire household including the household head, 
other married sons or head’s brothers also staying in the household. Rural household 
organization in Benin is discussed further in chapter 3, section 3.2.1. 
The majority of the respondents (68.67%) are the head of their households. The 
remaining 31.33% are adults conducting their own productive activities within a 
household. The sample includes only 8.9% of female household heads.  
 
1.6.3.Credit history 
Almost all respondents received individual loans; only 3.6% of the respondents 
received their loans through group lending.  
Figure 1.8 shows the average amount of FECECAM loans received by respondents 
from 2012 to 2017, per region and per gender. On average, Southern borrowers receive 
higher amounts of loans compared to the other regions for all years considered. The amount 
of loans received increases from the North to the South. Disaggregation by gender reveals 
that women receive smaller amounts of loan compared to men. The difference is important 
in the North and the South but not so much in the Center. 
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Chapter 1 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.1: Different farm loan products offered by FECECAM 
Loan products Amounts 
Annual 
interest 
rates 
Duration 
Individual / 
Group 
TPCF - Tout Petit Crédit aux 
Femmes (tiny loans for women) 
10,000 FCFA20 19% 
0-12 
months 
Group loans but 
given individually 
TPCH - Tout Petit Crédit aux 
Hommes (tiny loans for men) 
10,000 FCFA 19% 
0-12 
months 
Group loans but 
given individually 
CEE - Crédit Épargne avec 
Education (savings-credit with 
education)  
30,000 – 
400,000 FCFA 
19% 
6-12 
months 
Group loans but 
given individually 
for women 
CAFER - Crédit Agricole aux 
Femmes Rurales (agricultural 
loans for women in rural areas) 
30,000–
450,000 FCFA 
19% 
0-12 
months 
Group loans but 
given individually 
CFC - Crédit aux Femmes 
Commerçantes (loans for female 
small businesses) 
30,000–
400,000 FCFA 
19% 
0-12 
months 
Individual loans 
CAEP - Crédit à l’Agriculture ; à 
l’Elevage et à la Pêche (loans for 
crop production, livestock, and 
fishing) 
10,000-5M 
FCFA 
 
19% 
Short-
term: 0-
12months 
Individual and 
group loans 
30,000-30M 
FCFA 
 
18% 
Mid-term: 
24-36 
months 
30,000-30M 
FCFA 
18% 
Long-
term: 36-
120 
months 
Source: FECECAM 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
20 1 US dollar is approximately 550 FCFA (1 FCFA ≈ 0.0018 USD) 
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Table 1.2: Proportion of cohorts 
Cohort Share in sample (%) 
Before 2012 29.01 
Entered in 2012 9.49 
Entered in 2013 11.76 
Entered in 2014 8.02 
Entered in 2015 11.76 
Entered in 2016 18.05 
Entered in 2017 11.90 
Total 100 
 
 
Table 1.3: Summary statistics of clusters identified 
Variable 
Group 1 
Experienced 
borrowers 
Group 2 
Inexperienced 
borrowers 
All 
Average loan size over the studied period 
(100,000 FCFA) 
11.26 (12.63) 3.02 (2.61) 4.70 (7.00) 
Number of loans between 2012 and 2017 4.05 (1.77) 2.87 (1.67) 3.11 (1.76) 
Time since first loan with FECECAM21  (Years) 15.16 (7.33) 3.12 (2.83) 5.58 (6.40) 
Number of observations 153 595 748 
Notes: The k-means cluster analysis uses the Euclidian distance as the measure of similarity (dissimilarity) 
between observations. 
 
                                                 
21 The research accounts for other sources of formal loans. Thus, respondents were also asked about their 
first formal loan with any other MFI. On average, they entered a formal MFI program since 5.83 (6±.85) 
years. A two-sample t-test shows that there is no significant difference between the mean of the two variables: 
time since first FECECAM loan and time since first formal loan. This also confirms that the majority of the 
borrowers interviewed use FECECAM as their primary formal loan provider. 
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Table 1.4: Mean comparison of observed characteristics of experienced and inexperienced participants 
Variables Experienced Inexperienced Difference 
Age (years) 50.53 41.68 8.85*** 
Gender (Female =0; Male=1) 0.76 0.66 0.10** 
Household head (Yes=1; No=0)  0.79 0.66 0.13*** 
Number of years of schooling 4.72 3.10 1.62*** 
Number of years of conducting autonomous activities 25.49 17.16 8.33*** 
Learned a profession other than farming (Yes=1; No=0)  0.33 0.27 0.06 
Number of income generating activities conducted 2.89 2.74 0.16 
Is a grower (Yes=1; No=0) 0.78 0.85 -0.06* 
Number of different crops produced 1.83 1.84 -0.01 
Number of processing and trace activities 0.48 0.36 0.12** 
Raise Animal (Yes=1; No=0) 0.13 0.14 -0.01 
Belong to a family of native or first comers in the area (Yes=1; No=0) 0.58 0.55 0.03 
Have migrated at least once in search of work (Yes=1; No=0) 0.24 0.22 0.01 
Work migration length (month) 12.94 9.89 3.04 
Number of farmers’ organizations membership 0.18 0.20 -0.02 
Number of ROSCA22 membership 0.80 0.91 -0.11 
Benefit from extension services in 2017 (Yes=1; No=0) 0.29 0.23 0.05 
Number of extension worker visits in 2017 1.06 0.75 0.31 
Time to the closest FECECAM branch one-way (minutes) 22.37 34.03 -11.66 
Cost to the closest FECECAM branch one-way (FCFA) 459.80 687.28 -227.48*** 
Repurposed the latest loan obtained (Yes=1; No=0) 0.78 0.81 -0.02 
 
 
                                                 
22 Rotating Savings and Credit Association 
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Table 1.4 (Continued): Mean comparison of observed characteristics of experienced and inexperienced 
participants 
Variables Experienced Inexperienced Difference 
Household characteristics 
Household size 8.85 7.89 0.96*** 
Number of production unit heads23 2.57 2.33 0.24*** 
Number of consumption units (mouths to feed based on needs) (adult equivalent24) 7.79 6.76 1.03*** 
Number of cooking units25 1.52 1.26 0.25*** 
Total workforce available in the household based on member time allocation (adult 
equivalent) 
6.56 5.52 1.04*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Table 1.5: Gender and age of respondents by location 
 Proportion (%) Age (years) 
 Female Male Female Male 
North 27.52 72.48 43.68 (12.01) 42.53 (11.33) 
Center 40.64 59.36 41.12 (9.88) 41.81 (12.83) 
South 28.45 71.55 45.06 (9.51) 46.68 (10.33) 
Total 32.22 67.78 42.99 (10.55) 43.72 (11.65) 
 
                                                 
23 A production unit is a homogenous unit within the farm household which has autonomy in terms of activity, decision, and resources use but which head 
(household member and dependent) still reports to the household head. 
24 To convert household members into adult equivalent consumers, we use FAO coefficients of conversion: 0.4 for children under 5, 0.7 for 6-10 years 
old, 1 for 16-50 year olds, 0.8 for the 56-65 age group and 0.8 for those over 65 years. Since rural women are responsible for a large number of activities 
requiring sustained physical activity and often being pregnant or breastfeeding, no additional coefficient has been affected for their physiological needs 
and conversion rate in adult equivalent. 
25 The “cooking units” or “kitchens” refer to distinct food management and food preparation units within a household 
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Figure 1.1: Number of clients served by MFIs over time in Benin 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Amount of savings deposited to MFI over time in Benin 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2016 
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Figure 1.3: Loan application timing during the studied period 
 
Source: FECECAM database 
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of respondents and sampled service points 
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Figure 1.5: Number of agricultural loan recipients between 2012 and 2017 in the 
population and in the sample by studied region26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Number of years during which clients took loans by their entry time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
26Borrowers in the South have been oversample in order to obtain the 26 recipients per service point like the 
other regions. 
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Figure 1.7: Average years of schooling by gender and location 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.8: Amount of FECECAM loan received over time by region and gender 
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2. Agricultural loans and farm labor: a broader perspective on the impact of 
microcredit 
 
2.1.Introduction 
The agricultural sector continues to play a significant role in the development of low-
income countries. The sector represents a significant part of the economy of these countries 
in terms of both aggregate income and total labor force. By generating income and 
employment in rural areas, agriculture contributes to both poverty reduction and income 
growth in developing countries where nearly 60% of the labor force is employed in 
agriculture (Dethier and Effenberger, 2012). 
Population growth is projected to keep its upward trend and highest population growth 
rates will continue to be in developing regions for the coming decades (UN-DESA, 2010). 
This rapid growth of the population places higher demands on global agricultural 
production. According to the theory of intensification of farming systems developed by 
Boserup (1965) and Ruthenberg (1971), the BR model of intensification, population 
growth provides the necessity for agricultural intensification, while market access created 
by rapid urbanization and economic growth offer new opportunities. However, output 
growth requires increased cost of labor and other inputs per farmed area (Binswanger-
Mkhize and Savastano, 2017). Moreover, agricultural productivity growth drives not only 
increased factors use but also the adoption of technology by farmers, e.g. land-saving 
technologies such as organic manure and fertilizer to offset declining soil fertility or labor-
saving technologies such as machines. 
Most intensification and modernization pathways require funding, which is not always 
available to farmers in developing countries, especially the smallholders. Thus, rural credit 
market has a crucial role to play in factor markets as it provides working poor with access 
to affordable capital to acquire the needed inputs. 
The objective of this chapter is to relate credit availability to farmers’ labor input 
decisions. Rural wage labor market has the potential to develop economic linkages between 
the small pool of households owning large shares of productive land and the remaining 
landless or those with limited access to land but with excess labor. Thus, rural labor market 
could serve as an important pathway out of poverty enabling resource-poor farmers with 
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excess labor to earn wage income and improve their economic well-being. More, credit 
provision could also play an important role on the rural labor market by allowing farmers 
to purchase the inputs they need, including labor. In developing countries, job creation is a 
major concern for policymakers. In these countries where agriculture represents an 
important source of livelihood and a sizeable share of the economy, farm labor market 
represents a significant source of employment opportunity. 
The agricultural sector in Benin is dominated by small to medium farm households 
conducting polyculture often associated with small livestock (poultry, small ruminants, or 
pigs). These farm households count on average seven members and farm 1.7 ha of land. 
Only 5% of farms in the South and 20% in the North exploit more than 5 ha (MAEP, 2011). 
Given the small farm sizes and other economic constraints, agriculture is operated 
predominantly by human power–76% of land preparation is done manually and 23% by 
animal draft. Figure 4.1. depicts the percentages of labor force employed in agriculture 
over time in Benin.  
The relevance of a study on the effects of agricultural loans on farm labor use can be 
easily established. Several scholars feared that agricultural intensification may worsen the 
conditions of smallholder farmers in developing countries as large holders, not only, may 
grab their land, but also invest in labor-saving technologies, leaving landless farmers with 
excess labor unemployed. Finding evidence suggesting that agricultural loans foster labor 
hiring in the sector would invalidate such hypothesis and reinsure stakeholders and actors 
of both the agricultural and credit sectors. 
The literature on the impact of microcredit on employment is very scant, and results 
are very mixed. According to Erhardt (2017), the evidence of the effects on employment is 
still limited for two reasons. First, the vast majority of evaluated programs are not designed 
to create employment. Rather, they aim at increasing income and consumption, poverty 
reduction or various other outcomes such as children school attendance or empowerment 
of women. Second, those studies which do assess programs aiming at employment creation 
are usually limited to the impact on self- employment. In the literature, only very few 
evaluations investigate the impact of microfinance on labor demand and most of them focus 
on child labor (e.g. Angelucci, Karlan, & Zinman, 2015; Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, & 
Kinnan, 2014; Blume & Breyer, 2011; Hazarika & Sarangi, 2008). 
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In this chapter, a descriptive analysis of the role of agricultural loan in borrowers’ labor 
input choices is performed. The chapter uses data of growers’ subsample. The analysis 
does not claim causality but allows to examine how lagged farm loans received over the 
studied period are correlated with farmers’ current labor use. Results suggest that past loans 
have residual effects on both hired and family labor use of agricultural borrowers. Farm 
loans, especially those obtained for farm machinery are significantly correlated with 
reduction in hired labor expenditure. However, more family man-days are employed using 
the machine loans while other loan categories reduce the use of family labor. 
 
2.2. Farm household structure and labor use 
Considering the full nature of a farm household socio-economic organization is 
essential to understand how agricultural loans may affect farm households in general and 
its labor use in particular. 
The neoclassical agricultural household model conceives the farm household as a 
production and consumption unit, which converts its resources as well as purchased goods 
and services into values or utility when consumed (Becker, 1965; Lamarche, 1991; 
Mendola, 2007; Taylor and Adelman, 2003). 
Allocation within a farm household is similar to the allocation that takes place 
within a firm. Most farm households have a hierarchical structure in which much of the 
control over the household resources (land and capital) are concentrated in the hands of the 
household head (Fafchamps, 2002). Beside an hierarchical structure, farm households 
often establish an explicit division of labor along with a system of delegation of authority 
(Fafchamps, 2002; Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2003). The structure of farm households 
in Benin is consistent with this model. 
In Benin, there are several modes of social organization. The notion of household 
varies depending on the country’s regions from a small household with a head, and his wife 
(wives) and (their) children, to a household with multiple generations of “households” (for 
example siblings or close relatives with their spouses and children), all living in the same 
place, and reporting to the household head, often the elder. The case of Benin is similar to 
those of other Sub-Saharan African countries described by Fafchamps (2002) who stated 
that households in those countries are large and occasionally encompassing several couples 
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with their children. In parts of Benin, household members conduct multiple income 
generating-activities both on their own account and in collaboration with others 
(Fafchamps, 2002). The farm household engages in both market and non-market tasks such 
as farming, animal husbandry, fishing, crafts, trades, processing, gathering (fruits, nuts, 
fuelwood, water, etc.) (e.g. Fafchamps, 2002; Hunt, 1991). In Benin, as it is the case in 
most developing countries, there are many children on the farm households and they spend 
most of their time helping around the house or the farm. It is often argued that, the big size 
of the farm household is motivated by the fact that both children and wives serve as labor 
(Binswanger and McIntire, 1987; Fafchamps, 2002; Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2003).  
In Benin, the household is organized around a socially recognized head of 
household and includes all permanent dependents (often relatives) and migrants sent 
elsewhere for work or education/training but who maintain social and economic relations 
with the household (provide it with resources or still depend on the head). The farm 
household head controls most of the household resources; he allocates usufruct rights, and 
to some extent, he controls the labor force of his dependents. These resources are allocated 
to activities under his supervision or to those of his dependents (family workforces) who 
also manage autonomous production units of variable size within the farm household. It is 
important here to make the distinction between the household as a production unit (as 
defined earlier in this chapter) and production units within a farm household. In this study, 
a “production unit” (PU), is a homogenous unit within the farm household which has 
autonomy in terms of activity, decision, and resources use but which head (household 
member and dependent) still reports to the household head. The household head’s 
production unit is considered the main production unit and it is often the largest PU within 
the farm household. All the surveyed borrowers are production unit heads (PUH). 73.77% 
are the heads of their household whereas 26.23% are adult dependents conducting their 
own productive activities within the farm household. 
In Benin, as in most African societies, there are detailed evolved laws and customs 
governing the use and transfer of productive resources (land and capital) along with 
specific tasks and role division among household members according to their status (e.g. 
Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2003). These rules ensure the welfare of the household as a 
group by requiring work and economic participation from all members. For instance, all 
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dependents owe their labor to the household head (e.g. Iversen, 2002). Children also owe 
their labor to their respective mother. The household head in return provides shelter to the 
entire household, food27 to some extent and also provides pieces of land28 to each adult 
dependent in case they farm on their own account. Young children in the household, often 
male, may earn some pocket money or school fees by cultivating their own field, but they 
must first work on the household head’s field. Fafchamps (2002) described similar 
practices in his work on intra-household resources allocation. In Northern regions of Benin, 
adult sons often work for the household head on his fields in exchange for shelter, food, 
durable goods such as cellphones, radio, motor bikes, or for a full dowry or money to marry. 
 
2.3. Hypothesis of the chapter  
It is important to formulate hypotheses that will guide the conduct of this section of 
the dissertation. The hypotheses are the following:  
H1: Farmers in Benin reduce their family labor use in the presence of agricultural loans. 
H2: Farmers in Benin use more hired labor when they receive agricultural loans. 
 
2.4. Methodology 
A key threat to identification in microfinance studies is selection bias. Our study 
addresses this issue by using a cohort approach. The research is based on a cross-sectional 
data from a survey of FECECAM agricultural borrowers conducted in October 2017.The 
survey focuses on recipients who have been borrowing from the MFI for agricultural 
related reasons, at least since 2012. The sample includes some borrowers who had entered 
the program even before 2012 and borrowers who joined FECECAM from 2012 to 2017. 
By construction, the dataset retains all ‘dropouts;’ among the sampled clients, some have 
stayed ever since their entry and have taken loans multiple times (during several years) 
                                                 
27 For instance, Fafchamps, (2002) reported that in many Sahelian villages, the household head produces the 
main cereal which he provides part of to feed the household while women must provide the “sauce”, that is, 
the vegetables and condiments that spice up the household meal. Our field observation confirms this. More, 
in Benin, the farm household head could give a small financial allowance to his wives for items they cannot 
produce such as salt, oil, seasonings, etc.  
28 Evidence in the literature suggest that the practice of dependent’s plots, mostly observed in Western and 
Central Africa, is mainly a way to overcome commitment failure within the household (Balsvik, 1995; 
Fafchamps, 2002). 
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while others have dropped out after one or few loans. Section 1.5.3 details the sampling 
and identification strategies. 
The goal of this chapter is to measure the effects of agricultural loans on farm labor 
use of loan recipients. The analysis is restricted to borrowers who among other activities, 
grew crops during the agricultural season 2016-2017 and have obtained at least once a loan 
for that purpose from FECECAM during the six-years prior to the period of the survey. 
In general, FECECAM provides loans to farmers for specific activities. For 
instance, loans are provided for activities such as land preparation and planting, for inputs 
purchase or harvest. Table 4.1 summarizes the percentages of the different purposes for 
which sampled borrowers have received loans from FECECAM from 2012 to 2017. Over 
the six-years period considered, 26% of farmers took out loans from FECECAM for 
planting. This specific loan product is also called “agricultural season loan” and farmers 
can request a lump sum amount of loan for the entire production season, provided that the 
crop is clearly specified, or farmers can request smaller separate29 loans at different times 
of the production cycle. 21.6% of borrowers received loans for farm inputs purchase. Only 
2.5% of the surveyed borrowers received loans for the purpose of agricultural machine 
purchase. 
 To estimate the impact of these different loans on farmers’ labor use, loan purposes 
have been regrouped in five categories: (i) loan for planting or agricultural season, (ii) loan 
for harvest, loan for farm inputs purchase, (iv) loan for purchase of agricultural machines, 
and (v) other loans. 
Labor use decisions in the presence of agricultural loans 
The previous section describes the household structure and organization in the 
study area. In light of that particular configuration of the farm household, agricultural loans 
are expected to first influence family labor use. In fact, when a PU head receives a farm 
loan to expand its activities and needs additional labor force, (s)he has the choice between 
family labor or hired labor. The PU could also invest in agricultural machines to perform 
certain tasks, which would make it more productive, and over time, demand more labor for 
                                                 
29 Both FECECAM and its clients find it less risky to take loans for inputs purchase and then for the harvest 
once it is secured rather than taking a bigger loan for the whole agricultural season and face a weather shock 
or insect attack. 
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other labor intensive tasks such as harvest for example. When the PU head is the household 
head, (s)he has the ability to pull more of its dependent’s labor force as described earlier. 
However, family labor is becoming more constrained as schooling is required and children 
spend more time at school at the expense of the farm. Increased children schooling is also 
a common expected outcome of loans. Thus, the more children and dependents are 
schooled the less the PU use family labor. However, children schooling in the presence of 
agricultural credit is not addressed here.  
Production units’ labor use is defined as followed: 
𝐿𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐶𝑡,𝑖; 𝑋𝑖;  𝛽)  (1) 
where 𝐿𝑖 is the amount of family labor used in man-days or the expenditure on hired labor 
for each PUH during the agricultural season 2016-17. 𝐶𝑡,𝑖 is a vector of lagged loan 
amounts received for planting/agricultural season, input purchase, machine purchase, 
harvest or other purposes each year between 2012 and 2017. Loan amounts received for 
farm activities are expected accumulate over time or at least has residual effects years later. 
𝑋𝑖 is a vector of covariates including PU, household and farm characteristics as well as 
location dummies. 
The outcome variables considered are non-negative, thus, equation (1) is estimated 
using a tobit model. The tobit regression is suitable to the left-censored nature of the 
independent variable.  
The estimation equation, illustrating the cases of hired labor is expressed as:  
𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2012𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡2012𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡2012𝑖 +
𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒2012𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟2012𝑖 + ⋯ … + 𝛽26𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2017𝑖 + 𝛽27𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡2017𝑖 +
𝛽28𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡2017𝑖 + 𝛽29𝑀𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒2017𝑖 + 𝛽30𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟2017𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 (2) 
 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1.Descriptive analysis 
Type of labor used by borrowers 
Table 4.2 presents the proportion of respondents using different types of labor by 
region. Overall, surveyed PUH use a combination of family and hired labor. There are three 
categories of hired labor used by respondents: daily-paid laborers, seasonal workers and 
permanent workers. Seasonal laborers often come from different places, and stay on the 
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farm household for a given time, usually planting season or harvest time, and receive lump 
sum wages for their work. They are often hosted and fed by the PUH.  
The proportion of respondents using family labor for their productive activities 
decreases from the North to the South. However, this type of labor remains the most 
common labor source, except in the South where 89.33 % of the respondents use daily-
paid laborer. 11.24% of the borrowers in the South hire permanent workers on their farm. 
This share of permanent farm workers use is the highest across all three regions, indicating 
some modernization on farms in the Southern region. The use of seasonal laborers is more 
common in the Center. 
 
Family labor force 
The survey reports the percentage of time allocated by each household member to 
its own activities and to working or helping on all production units within the farm 
household. Time use is allocated to education, domestic chores, social and recreational 
activities, and to working on each production unit. For children under five years of age, 
time use is zero whereas most children in age to be in school spend on average, for boys 
56% and 46% for girls of their time working on the production units of the household 
during the agricultural season 2016-17. The household head’s PU is where all household 
members spent the most time compared to other PUs.  
Table 4.3 summarizes family labor in man-days used on all production units and 
specifically on the loan recipient’s production unit during the agricultural season studied. 
Households in the North use more man-days in the North than all other regions. The small 
number of family man-days in the South may be an indicator of increased schooling or 
reduced farming activities– the South is the most urbanized region of the country.  
Surveyed household member (sampled loan recipient), employs including 
himself/herself, on average 63.74% of the total family labor force (65.08% in the North, 
65.67% in the Center, and 58.66 % in the South). 
 
Crops produced 
 Overall, sampled borrowers grow on average 2.25 different crops. Table 4.4 
recapitulates the relative importance (%) of the different crops produced by respondents by 
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region. Overall, cash crops are mostly produced in the Northern and Central areas while 
food crops are produced in the South. Respondents in the North mostly grow maize and 
cotton which cover respectively 33.83% and 26.20% of the farmed areas. Soybean is also 
relatively important in that region and covers 13.76% of the areas. Apart from those three 
leading commodities, everything else is marginal. In the Center, the most produced crops 
are similar to the North, except cashew production (9.2%) is about as important as cotton’s. 
Peanuts is also relatively important in the Center (7.36%). In the Southern regions, the 
cropping system is dominated by food crops. Maize remains the most produced crop but 
followed by pepper, tomato, cassava, and pineapple. These last two commodities are highly 
processed and are the main raw materials that sustain the small and medium processing 
units in the South.  
The special case of cotton 
In Benin, cotton contributes to about 40 % of foreign exchange earnings, and the 
sector represents 12 % of the GDP according to the Ministry of Agriculture30. It is the most 
organized commodity chain in Benin. Cotton producers receive in-kind loans for seeds, 
pesticides, herbicides, and chemical fertilizers at the beginning of each production season. 
The inputs costs are deducted from their production before they are being paid for their 
harvest, which is sold to the professional cotton association - AIC (Association 
Interprofessionnelle du Coton). The AIC is a non-governmental association in charge of 
key aspects of the sector such as inputs supply, extension, quality control, and payment to 
farmers.  
Even though, most inputs are provided in forms of in-kind loans for the season, 
cotton growers still borrow additional substantial loans from FECECAM for their 
production. These loans are presumably for inputs not provided by the AIC such as labor 
and machine services.  
Cotton production take place exclusively in the Northern and Central areas of the country. 
In fact, no respondent in the South grow cotton (see Table 4.4). In those cotton production 
areas, as shown earlier, farmed areas are higher (8.29 ha and 6.71 ha respectively against 
3.58 ha in the South) and mechanization as well. It therefore seems that areas where other 
                                                 
30 Cited by Sasse (2016). 
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farm inputs are available, farmers still take out loans for hired labor or agricultural 
machines. 
 
Technologies used by respondents 
 It is important to discuss alternative technologies used by sampled farmers instead 
of manpower. Table 4.5 summarizes a few technologies used by sampled borrowers. 
Herbicide is used by nearly all borrowers in the North; 95.04% of producers report using 
herbicide on some of their plots. Similarly, agricultural machines (mostly tractors) and 
draft animal rental services use decreases from the North to the South. Also, respondents 
who own agricultural machines and draft animal are mostly found in the North. The use of 
both machines rental services and the purchase of labor-saving equipment are very minimal 
in the South where the farmed areas are smaller compared to other regions. In fact, in the 
South, sampled borrowers planted an average 3.58 ha, all crops combined, while 
respondents in the North and the Center farmed on average 8.29 ha and 6.71 ha 
respectively. 
 
2.5.2.Agricultural loans and farm labor use 
Hired labor 
Preliminary results (table 4.6) suggest that lagged amounts of loan taken from 
FECECAM have residual effects on current hired labor use. A very interesting and intuitive 
result is the effect of loans received for farm machines purchase on hired labor expenditure. 
All lagged loan amounts received statistically significantly affect current total expenditure 
on hired labor. Machine loans received in a more distant past have bigger marginal effects 
on current hired labor expenditure than recent machine loans. However, results show that 
recent loans received in 2016 and 2017 for machine purchase significantly reduces 
expenditure on hired labor respectively by 454,000 FCFA and 13,000 FCFA31. The effects 
of lagged amount of loans received for other purposes on hired labor expenses are mixed.  
As expected, PU with bigger farm sizes spend more on hired labor. In the Northern 
and Central regions, where farm sizes are bigger, borrowers spend more on hired labor 
                                                 
31 1 US dollar is approximately 550 FCFA (1 FCFA ≈ 0.0018 USD) 
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compared to the South and seem to invest more in agricultural machines/tools or rental 
services than in manpower.  
Furthermore, when asked about how easily they were able to find and hire labor in 
their area during the studied agricultural season, 20.45%, 30.30% and 24.20% of 
respondents respectively in the North, in the Center and in the South found it difficult to 
hire labor in their area. Also, when asked about their opinion on the impact of increased 
use of loan on the local labor market, more farmers in the North (26.45%) and the Center 
(16.84%) affirm that labor wage rates increased as a result of credit use in the area. In 
certain farmers’ opinion, mostly from the South (42.27%) and the Center (18.29%), the 
supply of labor force has actually increased in their area as a result of loan and more 
laborers are coming in from neighboring countries, mainly Togo and Nigeria. These 
statistics suggest that the effects of loans on the labor market is somewhat complex. 
Multiple effects interact leading to mixed outcomes depending on regional context.  
 
Family labor 
 There are less residual effects of past agricultural loans on family labor compared 
to hired labor. Machine loans statistically significantly increased the number of man-days 
of household members allocated to all PU and to the recipient’s PU in particular by 
respectively 27.17 and 26.80 man-days for the agricultural season 2016-17. Even though 
this result is surprising, it could be explained by the fact that farmers may be substituting 
labor in general by machines but use more family labor to perform the “reduced” tasks with 
these technologies. For example, farmers could use their dependents to operate draft 
animals for land preparation or for herbicide use. This invalidates our hypothesis that 
farmers reduce family labor use when they receive agricultural loans. 
 To complement the estimation of the effect of lagged loan categories on labor use, 
mean comparison of technologies used by respondents by region is performed. Tables 4.8 
and 4.9 show the results and confirm that borrowers in the Northern and Central regions 
invest more in technologies, which could be qualified as labor-saving; whether it is through 
the use of machines rental services or the direct purchase of the machines and draft animals. 
In the two regions, experienced borrowers significantly invest/spend in these technologies 
than control inexperienced ones. Borrowers in the two regions also seem not only, to use 
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less herbicides than the Southern ones, but also within the regions, experienced farmers 
employ less herbicides than inexperienced borrowers. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter examine the role of agricultural loans in farmers’ labor input choice. The 
effect of farm credit on employment is of great importance, not only for the farmers 
themselves but also at the macroeconomic level. With the significant unemployment rates 
that prevail in most poor economies and the current context of massive migration from 
rural to urban areas or from developing countries to developed ones, a highly-expected 
outcome from farm credit is to generate growth in borrowers’ income with job creation 
other than self-employment. However, even in the latter case, loans could make individual 
farmers more productive and help them out of poverty.  
 The results of this chapter show that impact of agricultural loans on labor is quite 
mixed. Certainly, loan availability made it possible for recipients to substitute hired labor 
for family labor, invest in technologies and agricultural machines to avoid exhausting 
manual work. The study showed that past loans have residual effects on both hired and 
family labor use. Farm loans, especially those obtained for farm machinery significantly 
reduce expenditure on hired labor but more family labor is employed using the machine 
loans while other loan categories reduced the use of family labor. 
The weakness of the estimated effects of credit on farm employment is also be 
related to the growing scarcity of labor force in rural areas. First, children who would have 
been employed as family labor are now in school. In fact, out-of-school children rate has 
significantly decreased in Benin over the past ten years according to the UNESCO (2016) 
data. Therefore, hired labor, previously made up of young people seeking their own income 
in addition to the work they do on the household (head) production units, is less available. 
Also, rural flight may be another cause of labor shortage. At the same time, wage rates are 
increasing in some areas. Overall, multiple interacting mechanisms explain the effects of 
agricultural loans on farm employment. 
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Chapter 2 Tables and figures  
Table 2.1: Purpose of loan obtained from 2012 to 2017 (%) 
Loan type 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Tota
l 
Not for a particular activity 0.4 0.3 1.1 2.3 2.2 1.1 1.5 
For planting /agricultural season 
loan 
27.9 30.9 36.0 27.7 19.9 24.0 26.0 
For crop storage cost 6.1 4.6 2.1 4.2 3.4 4.0 3.8 
For warrantage / inventory credit 0.0 1.4 0.3 0.0 1.9 0.2 0.8 
For harvest 1.0 2.2 2.9 2.0 3.2 0.9 2.1 
For inputs purchase 16.0 16.0 18.8 18.6 23.1 27.5 21.6 
For agricultural machine purchase 5.3 3.2 2.5 2.8 1.7 2.2 2.5 
For agricultural products 
processing 
2.1 1.0 1.5 3.1 2.2 2.0 2.1 
For food crop trade 7.2 6.6 7.0 9.7 9.3 7.2 8.1 
For trade of agricultural-related 
products 
17.6 22.3 17.7 17.3 19.4 15.9 18.3 
Others 16.5 11.3 10.0 12.4 13.7 15.0 13.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
100.
0 
100.
0 
 
 
Table 2.2: Share of respondents using family labor, day laborers, seasonal laborers, and 
permanent workers (%) 
Regions N Family labor Day laborer Seasonal laborer Permanent worker 
North 244 93.85 80.33 15.57 2.05 
Center 203 92.12 77.34 29.06 2.96 
South 178 72.47 89.33 25.84 11.24 
All 625 87.20 81.92 22.88 4.96 
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Table 2.3: Family labor in man-days used on all PUs and on sampled borrowers’ PU 
Regions 
Family labor in man-days used on 
borrower’s PU 
Family labor in man-days used on all PU 
 Female Male Total Female Male Total 
North 160.71 406.79 567.50 334.77 537.21 871.98 
Center 170.00 334.48 504.48 354.22 414.01 768.23 
South 102.33 282.85 385.17 325.77 330.84 656.61 
All 147.23 348.61 495.84 338.48 439.43 777.92 
 
Table 2.4: Crops produced by respondents by region (% of area planted) 
 North Center South All 
Maize 33.83 35.86 17.55 30.71 
Cotton 26.2 13.33 0 15.91 
Soybean 13.76 20.23 0 12.59 
Peanuts 4.64 7.36 0.63 4.57 
Cashew 3.15 9.2 0 4.34 
Pepper 0 1.15 15.05 3.9 
Cassava 0.83 1.84 11.91 3.76 
Tomato 0 0.23 14.73 3.53 
Sorghum & millet 5.81 2.07 0 3.24 
Rice 5.14 1.84 1.25 3.17 
Beans 2.49 2.53 4.39 2.95 
Yam 3.81 3.45 0 2.8 
Sweet potato 0 0 8.46 1.99 
Onion 0 0 3.45 0.81 
Other crops 0.33 0.46 0.31 0.36 
Oil palm tree 0 0 0.94 0.22 
Pineapple 0 0 11.6 2.72 
Other vegetables 0 0.46 9.72 2.43 
Total  100 100 100 100 
 
Table 2.5: Few technologies used by respondents and their relative importance by region 
(%) 
 North Center South All 
Herbicide users 95.04  74.49  45.93  74.59  
Machines/draft animal rental 47.92  21.54  5.23  27.35  
Own agricultural machine/draft animal 52.82  16.19  3.57  30.10  
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Table 2.6: Tobit estimation results - Marginal effects of lagged loans amount on hired labor expenditure (in 100,000 FCFA) 
 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
 Coeff 
Std. 
Err. 
Coeff 
Std. 
Err. 
Coeff 
Std. 
Err. 
Coeff 
Std. 
Err. 
Coeff 
Std. 
Err. 
Coeff 
Std. 
Err. 
Planting loan 0.03 0.04 
-
0.53*** 
0.08 0.85*** 0.07 0.28*** 0.11 -0.70*** 0.14 -0.62*** 0.14 
Harvest loan 0.38 0.29 0.21 0.20 0.34 0.32 -2.09* 1.18 0.04 0.49 6.60*** 1.07 
Inputs 
purchase loans 
-0.13** 0.06 -0.04 0.08 0.34*** 0.12 -0.15 0.12 0.13 0.17 -0.29 0.28 
Machine 
purchase loan  
-0.13** 0.05 -4.54** 1.85 6.95*** 2.80 2.34** 1.13 -3.47*** 1.37 -6.04** 2.83 
Other loans 0.03 0.06 0.14** 0.06 -0.05 0.10 -0.03 0.08 -0.22** 0.10 0.15 0.16 
Note: Controls variables are omitted for ease of presentation. Control variables comprise total number of loans taken between 
2012 and 2017, the number of years since first received a loan from FECECAM, dummy for loans received from other MFI, 
dummy for other household member received a loan, total farmed area, cotton area, soybean area, maize area, respondent’s age, 
age squared, number of crops produced, dummy for household head, total household size, respondent’s level of education, net 
farm and non-income in 2016-2017, total value of productive assets owned, total estimated value of household durable assets 
owned, and location dummies 
 
Table 2.7: Tobit estimation results - Marginal effects of lagged loans amount on number of family man-days used 
 
 Family man-days employed on respondent’s PU  
2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Planting loan -6.85 4.90 -4.52 8.79 2.37 8.27 -0.98 12.24 12.56 15.93 -13.94 15.66 
Harvest loan -27.05 32.74 6.57 23.33 19.38 37.74 -143.85 134.00 71.97 56.27 -93.64 124.97 
Inputs 
purchase loans 
-4.04 4.88 7.65 7.32 2.59 12.44 -16.98 13.04 31.00* 18.72 -2.29 29.57 
Machine 
purchase loan  
26.80*** 6.33 150.84* 79.81 -237.51 168.19 -128.47 85.93 241.72** 110.55 91.88 172.69 
Other loans 0.54 7.24 6.69 6.81 -19.93* 10.75 43.90*** 9.53 47.11*** 11.84 -1.34 17.99  
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Table 2.7 (Continued): Tobit estimation results - Marginal effects of lagged loans amount on number of family man-days used 
Note: Controls variables are omitted for ease of presentation. Control variables comprise total number of loans taken between 
2012 and 2017, the number of years since first received a loan from FECECAM, dummy for loans received from other MFI, 
dummy for other household member received a loan, total farmed area, cotton area, soybean area, maize area, respondent’s age, 
age squared, number of crops produced, dummy for household head, total household size, respondent’s level of education, net 
farm and non-income in 2016-2017, total value of productive assets owned, total estimated value of household durable assets 
owned, and location dummies 
 
 
Family man-days employed on all PUs of the household  
2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Planting loan -7.16 5.75 -8.90 10.31 5.66 9.71 -4.54 14.36 -2.65 18.70 1.89 18.38 
Harvest loan 7.96 38.43 10.44 27.39 37.76 44.30 -145.65 157.28 90.05 66.04 104.89 146.68 
Inputs purchase 
loans 
-6.45 5.72 0.53 8.60 22.89 14.60 -30.18** 15.30 39.29* 21.97 46.38 34.71 
Machine 
purchase loan  
27.17*** 7.43 133.08 93.68 -165.50 197.40 -104.52 100.85 160.08 129.75 64.17 202.69 
Other loans -2.49 8.50 4.93 8.00 -16.24 12.62 38.31*** 11.18 32.48** 13.90 -8.56 21.12 
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Table 2.8: Mean comparison of technologies by respondents used by region (% of 
respondents) 
Regions Type of technology Experienced Inexperienced Difference 
North 
Herbicide use 92.31 95.79 -03.48 
Machines/draft animal rental 50.00 47.34 02.66 
Own machine/draft animal 68.18 48.34 19.84** 
Center 
Herbicide use 68.18 75.29 -07.11 
Machines/draft animal rental 27.27 20.81 06.46 
Own machine/draft animal 33.33 13.33 20.00** 
South 
Herbicide use 53.49 43.41 10.08 
Machines/draft animal rental 09.30 03.88 05.43 
Own machine/draft animal 06.45 02.47 03.98 
All 
Herbicide use 73.50 74.85 -01.34 
Machines/draft animal rental 30.77 26.53 04.24 
Own machine/draft animal 41.11 27.02 14.09*** 
 
Table 2.9: Mean comparison of expenditure on hired labor, herbicide, and machine rental 
services (in FCFA) 
Regions Variable Experienced Inexperienced Difference 
North Hired labor cost 141659.7 99660.00 41999.69 
Herbicide cost 137399.00 92237.08 45161.95** 
Rental cost 98309.62 41603.55 56706.06*** 
Center Hired labor cost 395650.00 148958.90 246691.10*** 
Herbicide cost 63393.18 35197.25 28195.93** 
Rental cost 46295.45 14700.29 31595.17*** 
South Hired labor cost 555136.50 313353.90 241782.60** 
Herbicide cost 38621.40 27871.32 10750.08 
Rental cost 266162.80 5116.28 261046.5* 
All Hired labor cost 341380.10 172975.5 168404.7*** 
Herbicide cost 87180.51 55263.22 31917.29*** 
Rental cost 150218.80 22560.90 127657.9*** 
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Figure 2.1: Share of labor force employed in agriculture as a percentage of the total labor 
force in Benin 
 
Source: World Bank 
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3. Does experience with agricultural loans improve farmers’ efficiency in Benin? A 
stochastic frontier analysis 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In Benin, as in most developing countries, the performance of the agricultural sector 
plays a significant role in the overall economic growth and development. In 2014, the 
agricultural sector contributed an average of 32.7% to the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP), and about 70% of the labor force was engaged in agriculture (MAEP, 2017). 
Therefore, in Benin, agricultural growth plays an outsized role in reducing rural poverty 
(Christiaensen, Demery, and Kuhl, 2011). Generally, the expected role of credit in the 
agricultural sector is to relax farmers’ financial constraints and to increase their use of 
productivity-increasing inputs. The expected impact of agricultural loans is, therefore, to 
help farmers bring their input levels closer to the optimal levels, thereby increasing output 
and productivity (Feder, Lau, Lin, and Luo, 1990). Because rural finance programs are 
subsidized using limited taxpayer money, it is necessary to quantify their impact. If, on the 
other hand, the marginal productivity of farm credit is minor, then resources may be better 
used elsewhere. 
This study evaluates the impact of agricultural loans on the whole-farm efficiency 
of borrowers in Benin. First, a stochastic translog profit frontier model is estimated, and 
farm efficiency scores are derived. Then, using a propensity-score matching technique, the 
efficiency scores of experienced borrowers are compared to those of inexperienced ones, 
providing a measure of the marginal effect of loan experience. In the context of this 
research, whole-farm profit efficiency is the most appropriate measure of loan impact since 
households tend to have multiple farming activities, and even a loan taken for a specific 
activity will ease a household’s overall cash constraint. 
An important policy concern in Benin, as in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
is how to raise agricultural production, given limited resources, to meet the growing 
demand of a growing population. Future agricultural growth must rely more on raising 
productivity rather than expanding resources. The potential importance of efficiency as a 
way of fostering production has generated a substantial number of studies (Bravo-Ureta 
and Pinheiro, 1993). Before further discussion, it is important to distinguish between 
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efficiency and productivity. Productivity growth can be achieved through technological 
progress and/or efficiency improvements; with each implying a different set of policies 
(Coelli, 1995). The efficiency of farmers and, more specifically, the efficiency gains from 
experience with agricultural loans matter because such gains present a sustainable and 
relatively low-cost way to achieve productivity growth. Measuring efficiency is the first 
step to potential resource savings (Bravo-Ureta and Rieger, 1991). If farmers are thus found 
to be reasonably efficient in their resource allocation, then the implication is that improving 
productivity necessitates new technology and inputs, something that would require 
investments in inputs provision, infrastructure, extension services and farm management 
services (Mubarak Ali and Byerlee, 1991). Lastly, there are various measures of efficiency 
in the literature. However, many of these are, by definition, partial measures (e.g., yield 
and labor productivity). Analysing profit efficiency—a process that generates measures of 
both technical and allocative efficiency—provides a more comprehensive view. 
In contrast to most previous studies in the area, this study utilizes a comprehensive 
definition of agricultural loans. Agricultural loans, here, refer to loans taken for all 
agriculture- related activities, including crop production, animal husbandry, processing, 
and trade and storage of agricultural commodities. Given the income-generating nature of 
all of these activities, restricting the evaluation of the effect of credit to crop production 
alone as a proxy for the rural world is a limiting approach. In the context of Benin, doing 
so would also systematically exclude rural women, since it is typically women who carry 
out these post-production activities. 
The study estimates the effects of agricultural loans provided by one particular 
micro-lender in Benin: Faîtière des Caisses d’Epargne et de Crédit Agricole Mutuel 
(FECECAM). In its current form, FECECAM is a network of savings and credit 
cooperatives with 136 service points throughout the country. It is, by far, the largest source 
of agricultural loans in Benin. This analysis exploits differences in when clients took out 
their first agricultural loan with FECECAM as the main source of identification of the 
effects of FECECAM’s agricultural loans. The study relies on a “pipeline” design, or 
cohort approach, in which subjects enter a program at different times. In this specific case, 
the design allows the comparison of individuals with greater experience with credit to those 
with little or none. The pipeline design represents a good alternative to a fully randomized 
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assignment because it offers a convincing control (Duvendack et al., 2011). Compared to 
studies that use similar methods and even compared to most microcredit impact studies, 
this research spans a larger impact timeframe (e.g., (Copestake, Bhalotra, and Johnson, 
2001; Maldonado and González-Vega, 2008). To the best of my knowledge, this study is 
the first of its kind to be carried out in Benin.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next section a conceptual 
framework explains the notion of efficiency and its underlying theoretical foundation, as 
well as laying down the hypothesized relationship between loans and efficiency. Then the 
following section describes the profit frontier function and the process of using it to 
estimate the average causal effect of FECECAM loans. Finally, the last section presents 
and discusses the results. 
 
3.2. Conceptual framework 
3.2.1.The concept of efficiency: definition and measurement 
The concept of efficiency is widely used in economics. It refers to the success of an 
agent, herein a farmer, in producing the maximum possible output from a given set of 
inputs (Farrell, 1957). Broadly, the notion of efficiency characterizes the utilization of 
resources. In a sense, efficiency is a relative concept: it compares the performance of a 
production unit to a standard.  
Standard production theory, with its underlying concept of the production function, 
provides the basic framework for the efficiency measures. The production function 
represents the maximum amount of output attainable from a given input bundle with fixed 
technology (Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt, 1977). Similarly, a cost function gives the 
minimum level of cost at which it is possible to produce some level of output, given input 
prices. Finally, a profit function provides the maximum profit that can be attained, given 
output price and input prices (Førsund, Lovell, and Schmidt, 1980). For each of the 
functions presented, the concept of maximality or minimality is essential. The term frontier 
can be meaningfully applied in each case because each function sets a limit to the range of 
possible observations. A frontier denotes a bounding function (Coelli, 1995). The 
pioneering work of Farrell (1957) led to the estimation of the so-called frontier production 
functions, instead of the average production functions estimated previously. The 
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production possibility frontier provides the theoretical representation of the farm 
production function and delimits the set of all possible outputs attainable for a level of input 
sets and technology available (Schmidt, 1985). Hence, one may observe points below the 
production (profit) frontier (farms producing less than the maximal possible output) or 
points on the frontier (efficient farmers) but no points can lie above the production (profit) 
frontier. The amount by which a farm lies below its production or profit frontier and the 
amount by which it lies above its cost function can be used as a measure of its inefficiency. 
The frontier function model of Farrell (1957) uses the efficient unit isoquant32 to 
measure economic33 efficiency, and to decompose this measure into technical and 
allocative efficiency (Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro, 1993). In the frontier function model, 
deviations from the frontier isoquant are associated with technical inefficiency and 
deviations from the cost minimizing input ratios denote allocative inefficiency. Technical 
efficiency (TE) indicates the farmer’s ability to produce the maximum output possible (the 
frontier output) given a set of inputs and technology. Put differently, technical inefficiency 
reflects the failure of attaining the highest possible level of output given inputs and 
technology. Allocative (or price) efficiency (AE) measures the farmer’s success in 
choosing the optimal input quantities that minimize costs, given the level of output and the 
relative factor prices. Stated differently, allocative efficiency refers to the ability of the 
farmer to use inputs in optimal proportions given their respective prices. Economic or total 
efficiency measures the overall performance of the farmer and is equal to the product of 
allocative and technical efficiencies. The choice of a specific measure of efficiency 
depends on the objective. 
Generally, there are two classes of frontier estimation methods: parametric and non-
parametric. Parametric frontiers rely on a specific functional form; they use econometric 
techniques to estimate the pre-specified functional form and inefficiency is modeled as an 
additional stochastic term. The stochastic frontier analysis proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) 
is an example of parametric frontier approach. Non-parametric frontiers do not rely on a 
                                                 
32 The concept of frontier unit isoquant used by Farrell, (1957) evolved into the production and cost frontiers 
of today (Kopp and Diewert, 1982). 
33 Some of the paper’s terminology differs from what Farrell used in his work. For instance, Farrell used the 
term price efficiency instead of allocative efficiency and the term overall efficiency instead of economic or 
production efficiency. The terminology employed in this paper follows what has been often used in recent 
literature. 
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specific functional form and use linear (or mathematic) programming. They were first used 
by Farrell (1957) and reformulated as a mathematical programming problem by Charnes, 
Cooper, and Rhodes (1978). Data envelopment analysis is the most commonly used non-
parametric approach. Frontier models can also be categorized into deterministic and 
stochastic frontiers. In deterministic models, measurement errors or other sources of noise 
are not taken into since the model assumes that any observed deviation from the estimated 
frontier is due to inefficiency, while the stochastic approach allows for statistical noise 
(Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro, 1993; Coelli, 1995). 
 
3.2.2.Agricultural loans and farmers’ efficiency 
Despite the expansion of microloan programs, the literature lacks consensus regarding 
the effectiveness of such programs. On one hand, studies show that microfinance does help 
the poor improve their productivity as well as their well-being and enables them to pull out 
of poverty (Girabi and Mwakaje, 2013; Otero, 1999; Pitt and Khandker, 1998). On the 
other hand, other studies claim that evidence supporting the positive impact of 
microfinance interventions is thin and lacking in rigor (Banerjee et al., 2014; Feder et al., 
1990; Roodman and Morduch, 2014).  
Agriculture in developing countries has experienced profound changes in the face of a 
rapid technological change. In a traditional agriculture, farmers mostly depend on their 
own resources and have had a long period to adjust their management to the most efficient 
use of their resources in their environment. However, in a dynamic setting, characterized 
by a continually changing technical and economic environment, it is more difficult for 
farmers to adjust their allocative decisions to keep up with changes in their environment 
and, simultaneously maintain an efficient allocation of resources. Thus, in such context, 
farmers are more likely to be in a state of continuous disequilibrium with potentials and 
benefits in improving their information and skills to reduce their technical and allocative 
errors (Ali and Byerlee, 1991). 
Access to financial instruments closely influences farmers’ decision to invest and to 
produce (Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto, and Udry, 2014). Microfinance services in general, 
and microcredit specifically has a very important role to play in today’s technically-
dynamic agriculture that depends greatly, inter alia, on the use of purchased inputs, hired 
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labor, machinery services or financial services. In fact, when assessing the determinants of 
farm level variation in efficiency, several studies conclude that access to credit has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on farmers’ technical and allocative efficiency 
(Ali, Parikh, and Shah, 1994; Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro, 1993). For instance, five out of 
eight studies in the review of Bravo-Ureta and Pinheiro, (1993) showed that credit has a 
positive and significant effect on the efficiencies of the farmers. The current study 
identifies different channels of influence of agricultural loans on farmers’ efficiency. 
At the beginning of the production period, agricultural loans may augment farmers’ 
initial endowment to help them face lump sum productive investments. Given the 
indivisible nature34 of some inputs needed, lump sum expenses are required. Cash 
constraint could lead to a bad combination of inputs if the farmer is unable to purchase 
those inputs at all, causing inefficiencies. Credit availability, therefore, allows constrained 
farmers to make the optimal input mixes to produce efficiently (optimal input mix effect). 
Given that production efficiency depends on input decisions, microfinance services, 
and more specifically agricultural loans will increase borrower’s productive power by 
fostering investment in farming activities and improving farmers’ access to inputs. More 
specifically, agricultural loans will lead to the purchase of better performing or modern 
inputs that may be costly but have higher returns. Even though these technologies may 
increase the production cost, they often have economies of scale that lead to higher output 
levels per production costs. Obviously, everything else equal, farmers with better inputs 
access are expected to have higher efficiency levels compared to the constrained ones who 
are more likely to underinvest in resources. Thus, agricultural loans will positively affect 
farmers’ total efficiency. Production loans, by relaxing farmers’ budget constraint grants 
them the opportunity to purchase and use technologies such as improved seeds, fertilizers, 
pesticides, farm machinery, etc. Most of these technologies will increase farmers’ output, 
profit, and productivity (scale effect). 
However, one can argue that the mere provision of loans may help farmers operate at 
a higher production frontier but might not necessarily make them more efficient. In this 
study, the treatment variable considered is not the access to credit but the experience with 
                                                 
34 For example, farmers cannot purchase portions of a pesticide bottle because (s)he has a small farm. 
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the loans over a relatively extended period of time. If the simple provision of loans does 
not help farmers improve their resource allocation, their experience with the loans over 
time is more likely to help them learn the best practices, and this learning and experience 
will ultimately help farmers adjust their technical and allocative decisions to reach an 
equilibrium of efficiency. Farmers with more experience with loans are expected to be 
more efficient as they learned over time how to choose the right proportions of inputs to 
produce the most possible output not only to be profitable but also to be efficient. 
Furthermore, most loan programs including FECEAM’s offer training as well as 
educational support to their clients to help them improve their management as well as their 
financial skills to better conduct their funded activities. In this case, it is reasonable to 
expect such loan programs to have a positive impact on clients’ allocative efficiency 
particularly. Recall, allocative efficiency is the ability to use optimal proportions of inputs. 
Allocative inefficiencies are errors in the allocation of inputs within expenditure levels. 
These inefficiencies, for the factors that depend on the farmers, are caused mostly by 
inadequate information; other causes of allocative inefficiency include market failure in 
input supply, differential risk effects of inputs, institutions (e.g., tenancy) (Ali and Byerlee, 
1991). Borrowers with higher numbers of loans, which imply several pieces of training 
from the MFI, are expected to have a higher (allocative) efficiency score 
((learning/experience effect). More, credit users with frequent extension visits and a higher 
educational level may have higher efficiency levels. 
Finally, the examination of secondary data provided by FECECAM showed that some 
farmers requested amount of loans that are smaller than the amounts they have in their 
saving account(s). In other words, they could have invested their savings in their productive 
activities but they prefer to take out loans. These borrowers argued that such behavior 
“pushes them to work harder and produce better”. FECECAM staff members confirm this 
explanation of such behavior arguing that, having the weight of a loan that needs to be 
repaid, gives some borrowers a reason to “work harder” to have a successful production 
season. Even though, this argument is anecdotal, one can argue that agricultural loans have 
an incentivizing effect that pushes farmers to produce the highest possible output with their 
resources. Farmers improve their production process to be able to make profit and repay 
the loan including the interests. 
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3.3. Empirical framework 
3.3.1.The profit frontier function 
In the literature, technical and allocative inefficiencies have been widely studied in the 
context of single-output technologies (Kumbhakar, 1996). This paper models these 
inefficiencies in a multiple-output, multiple-input context. The sample agricultural 
borrowers conduct several productive activities including multiple crops production, 
animal raising, processing and trade of agricultural products. Overall, they conduct on 
average 2.77 (1.21) distinct income generating activities including non-farm one. More 
in detail, on average, sampled borrowers produce 1.84 (1.24) different crops, conduct 0.38 
(0.64) distinct agricultural products processing and trade activities, and 13.90 % 
(34.62%) raise animals. In such context, inputs can be assumed non-allocable, meaning 
that one observes the total quantities of the different inputs used in the production process, 
instead of the quantities of each inputs allocated to different outputs (Kumbhakar, 1996). 
The production process is therefore represented by a single equation including all outputs 
and inputs.  
Typically, (economic) efficiency is analyzed by examining separately its two 
components: technical and allocative efficiencies, and the conventional production 
function approach suffices to measure these efficiencies. However, a production function 
may not be appropriate when estimating the production efficiency of individual farms when 
they face different input and output prices and have different factor endowments (Ali and 
Flinn, 1989; Yotopoulos and Lau, 1979). In fact, in such case, farms have different best-
practice or frontier production functions and, thus, operate at different optimal points. 
Consequently, a stochastic profit frontier function, which is more suitable, is applied to 
directly estimate farm-specific efficiencies. This estimation process incorporates prices 
differences, market distortions but maintains the advantage of the stochastic frontier 
properties in efficiency analysis (Ali and Flinn, 1989; Wang, Cramer, and Wailes, 1996). 
The profit frontier combines both measures of efficiency into one, the profit efficiency. In 
this profit relationship, errors in the production decision translate into lower profits or 
revenue for the farmers (Ali et al., 1994). In addition, deviation of actual profits from the 
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profit frontier function can be interpreted as the aggregated technical and allocative 
inefficiency (Ali et al., 1994).  
Scholars have also argued that socio-economic variables should be incorporated 
directly in the frontier model because such variables may have direct impact on the 
efficiency (Battese and Coelli, 1995; Kumbhakar, Ghosh, and McGuckin, 1991). Put 
differently, the stochastic frontier model should be estimated as a function of explanatory 
variables, reflecting farm-specific characteristics. This study integrates directly farm-
specific characteristics in the estimation of the stochastic profit frontier function. 
The stochastic profit function is defined as followed:  
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖;  𝛽)𝜀𝑖   (1) 
where 𝜋𝑖  is the profit aggregated over all farming activities of the i
th borrower and 
calculated as the gross revenue less the variable costs. 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of input expenditures 
(labor and other variable costs/capital) of the ith borrower and 𝛽 is the unknown parameters 
to be estimated. The ith borrower makes profit using the technology 𝑓(𝑥𝑖;  𝛽). A borrower 
make lower profit than predicted by the profit function when errors occur in the production 
system, leading to inefficiencies denoted by 𝜀𝑖. The inefficiency term satisfies the condition 
0 < 𝜀𝑖.< 1 and the closer 𝜀𝑖 is to 1, the more (profit) efficient the borrower is.  
To estimate the stochastic profit frontier, the study assumes that the profit function 
takes a translog35 form. The translog functional form offers a relative flexibility compared 
to a Cobb-Douglas function. In fact, a translog profit function does not impose assumptions 
about constant elasticities of production nor elasticities of substitution between inputs, 
allowing the data to reveal the actual curvature of the function, rather than imposing a priori 
assumptions. The translog profit frontier, illustrating a case of two inputs, is expressed as:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝜋𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥1𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥1𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥1𝑖 +
𝛽5𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥2𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥2𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   (2) 
Consistent with the frontier concept, the error term 𝜀𝑖 in the profit function is also a 
compound disturbance term, which have a strictly nonnegative and symmetric distribution, 
respectively.  
𝜀𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖 
                                                 
35 Several studies including Kopp and Smith (1980) indicated that functional specifications have little to no 
impact on measured efficiency. 
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𝑣𝑖, which is the idiosyncratic component, is independently (iid) ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣) distributed over 
the observations and reflects random factors beyond the control of producers such as the 
weather. 𝑢𝑖 is a one-sided disturbance term that represents the inefficiency component. It 
is assumed to have a half-normal distribution (non-negative and absolute value of a normal 
distribution).  
Next, the profit inefficiency term is specified as a function of covariates 𝑍𝑗 including socio-
demographic as well as farm-specific characteristics such as borrowers’ education, contact 
with extension service, etc. 
𝑢𝑖 =  𝛼0  +  ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑗
𝑍𝑗𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖   
Both the profit frontier function and the inefficiency models are estimated jointly using 
the maximum likelihood estimation method. 
 
3.3.2.Estimating the effect of loan experience on borrowers’ efficiency 
The ultimate goal of the study is to estimate the average causal effect of FECECAM 
loans on the efficiency of its agricultural borrowers. Earlier, in section 1.5.3, the biggest 
threat to identifying that causal effect has been addressed. The study exploits clients’ 
program entry timing along with their borrowing history with FECECAM to construct 
reliable treatment and control groups using a clustering technique. The treatment 
considered is the experience with FECECAM loans. The treated group represents 
borrowers, to whom the MFI has been lending for an extended period. More specifically, 
the treated group includes borrowers, who, on average, have joined FECECAM 15 years 
prior to the study, have taken four times a loan and have received an average of 1,126,000 
FCFA of loan each time. A total of 153 borrowers (20.45%) meet those conditions in the 
sample. The control group consists of borrowers, who, on average, entered the loan 
program only three years before the study, have obtained a loan two to three times, and 
have received an average amount of 300,000 FCFA of loan each time they have borrowed. 
79.55% of the sample falls into that category. 
The K-means cluster analysis permits to create two groups within which observations 
are very similar, but observations in different groups could also be dissimilar. In other 
words, borrowers within the treatment or the control group share very similar 
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characteristics, however, as shown by the results from the t-test (table 1.4), experienced 
borrowers could differ from inexperienced ones based on some observables features such 
as age. 
One way to bridge that gap between the treatment and the control group is to match 
similar borrowers based on those factors of dissimilarity across groups, that actually are 
not influenced by their experience with loans, but instead determine their likelihood to be 
treated, here to be an experienced borrower. All these factors are “summarized” for each 
subject in a so-called propensity score, in this case, the propensity to be an experienced 
borrower. More specifically, the propensity scores are the conditional (predicted) 
probabilities of receiving treatment given pre-treatment or baseline characteristics. The 
study computed the propensity scores of the sampled borrowers using a logistic function. 
𝑝(𝑥) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐷 = 1|𝑧) = 𝐸(𝐷|𝑧) 
Where D is the dependent variable and take the values D = 0 for control 
observations and D = 1 for treated observations; 𝑧 is a set of explanatory variables. 
The covariates used to predict sampled borrowers’ probability to be treated are the 
lender’s selection criteria along with other factors drawn from the literature. For instance, 
the borrower’s age is an important criterion of selection for the cooperative and thus, a 
significant predictor of treatment. To be eligible for a loan with FECECAM, applicants 
must be 18 to 70 years old at most. Applicants must also have some experience conducting 
income generating activities as well. Therefore, working young and middle-aged adults are 
more likely to have some borrowing experience with FECECAM. Women are also 
“trusted” because they tend to have a lower rate of default. For proximity matter, 
FECECAM requires all its applicants to reside in the town or at least in the Commune36 in 
which they are requesting a loan. Indicators of wealth and the ability to provide collaterals 
also greatly affect the lender’s decision to provide a loan. Consequently, predicting 
variables used are socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender, educational level, 
status in the household, work migration experiences as well as household structure 
including household size, family workforce computed in adult equivalent37. The covariates 
                                                 
36 Communes are the second administrative territorial divisions in Benin after villages/cities and there are 
seventy-seven (77) communes in Benin. 
37 To estimate family workforce in adult equivalent (eqa), the age of each household member actually 
working or helping on the production units of the household is multiplied by the following coefficients: 0.33 
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also comprise socio-economic features such as the number of income generating activities, 
years of experience conducting farming activities, land available to the household, 
household assets, farm and non-farm income, and the proximity to a FECECAM service 
point as well as the location in an agricultural zone. Note that except for gender and 
location, these variables are related to the age of the borrower. 
In a next step, individuals from the treatment group, the experienced borrowers, are 
matched to those in the control group that have similar level of propensity score. Given 
that the number of borrowers in the control group is more than three times the number of 
those in the treatment group, each experienced borrower is matched to three nearest 
“neighbors” in the control group, i.e., the three nearest inexperienced borrowers with 
similar propensity scores. Finally, treatment effects are calculated by comparing the 
outcomes (efficiency levels) of matched observations. The causal effect of FECECAM 
loan experience on the whole-farm efficiency of borrowers is assessed using two treatment 
effects statistics: the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and the Average Treatment Effect 
on the Treated (ATET or ATT). 
 
3.3.3. ATE versus ATET 
The average treatment effect (ATE) measures the effect that a substantial experience 
with FECECAM loans would have on the entire population or what would have happened, 
had all borrowers been treated or experienced. To obtain the ATE, the potential outcome 
(PO) of each subject in the sample is calculated first. The PO is the outcome that would be 
observed if each sampled individual received a specific value of the treatment (the 
counterfactual). For experienced borrowers, the PO if they were inexperienced is computed 
while for the PO if experienced is estimated for borrowers in the control group. The ATE 
is the average difference between the actual outcome and the potential outcome of each 
subject. 
The average treatment effect on the treated (ATET or ATT) estimates the effect of the 
treatment on those who received it, in other words, how much the efficiency of the 
                                                 
eqa for a child from 6 to 10 years, 0.66 for a child from 11 to 15 years old, 1 for a person from 16 to 50 years 
old, 0.66 from 51 to 65 years and 0 beyond. These are the FAO coefficients for adult equivalency in labor 
force.  
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treatment group improved as a result of their experience with FECECAM loans. The ATET 
is the difference between the outcome of the treated and the control groups. 
The ATE and the ATET answer different economic policy questions, especially in 
cases like this where participation is voluntary. The ATE estimates the effect of a policy or 
program on the persons induced to change participation status by the policy/program. It 
ignores the effect of the variation in policy parameter on inframarginal person (Heckman, 
1997). Participation in FECECAM’s loan program is voluntary and one can argue that there 
will always be individuals who will choose not to borrow from the institution. Instead of 
considering the marginal effect of FECECAM loans for the entire population, the effects 
of FECECAM loans in its current state, on those who choose to participate may be more 
informative. For the German Development Institute who commissioned this investigation, 
the ATET estimating the effects on those who actually choose to borrow is a better 
indicator of the effect of loan on efficiency compared to the ATE expressing the effects of 
loans in a hypothetical scenario where everyone in the population would borrow from 
FECECAM. In the case of a required vaccine for instance, the ATE would be more 
meaningful. 
The ATET, however, can be criticized from different standpoints. In general, the 
assumptions required to estimate the ATET are less restrictive and weaker than those 
required to estimate the ATE. Thus, ATET could suffer from biases, especially in 
observational studies if the treatment and the control groups are not similar. Though, it is 
shown not to be case in this study (see section 1.5.3.). Typically, the ATET should38 give 
the same results as a t-test between the outcomes of the treatment and the control groups. 
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1.Data overview 
Variables description 
Table 3.1 presents a descriptive summary of the variable used in the analysis. The 
sample includes 67.78% of male respondents, and the average age of all respondents is 
about 43 years. The average credit user has three years of education, conducts three income 
                                                 
38 Unlike the ATE, the estimation of the ATET requires finding matches for treated subjects only. Thus, all 
individuals in the control group may not be used. 
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generating activities, farm and non-farm included, and has been conducting those activities 
for 19 years. Their households have an average of eight members, which is relatively large 
compared to the country mean of 5.8739 recorded by Benin’s population census of 2013. 
Likewise, the area of land available and owned by the households of the respondents is 
high, 9.3 ha on average. Even the mean value of household durable goods or assets owned 
by the respondents in 2017 during the survey indicates that the sample of borrowers does 
not mainly include the traditional poor small farmers. The average value of the household 
assets owned by the respondents is 2,000,000 FCFA. 
Farming activities  
The study considers all farm related activities funded by FECECAM. Specifically, 
agricultural loans, in this analysis, refers to loans taken for agricultural related activities 
including crop production, animal husbandry, processing, and, trade of agricultural 
commodities. As shown earlier, farmers in Benin are engaged in multiple farming activities 
that contribute to their income, thus to their farm profit. Each respondent weighted the 
relative contribution of their various activities to their monetary income. The average 
weight obtained represents an approximate value of the relative contribution of each type 
of activity to the farmer’s income. The relative contribution of the activities are described 
by region in figure 3.1. 
 Overall, in all studied regions, crop production remains the main source of income 
for the sampled borrowers. It comprises more than 50% of their income. The contribution 
of crop production to the respondent’s income increases from the South to the North. For 
borrowers in the North, crop production comprises 82.2% of income. Maize is the main 
crop produced (30.5% of income), followed by cotton (27.4%) and soybean (11.7%). 
Concerning animal raising, cattle dominate. Agricultural products are marginally 
processed but mainly used in local street food production in this region. 
In the Center, even though crop production is the main source of income, trade of 
agricultural products represents a sizeable portion of the recipients’ income. Trade in the 
Center totalizes the highest contribution to income compare to the North and the South. 
Processing activities remain moderate, but more important than in the North. Animal 
                                                 
39 Data made available by Benin Data Portal (2016). 
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husbandry contributes to 4.1% of recipients’ income in the region, and mostly through 
livestock trade. Animal husbandry is more diversified compared to the North, and cattle 
are dominant but followed by pigs. 
While income structures in the North and Center do not differ fundamentally, it is 
not the case in the South. The main source of income remains crop growing (57.0%) but 
the leading crops are pepper (8.6%), maize (6%), cassava (6%), pineapple (5.6%), sweet 
potato (4.9%) and tomato (4.8%). Farm produces are more often processed locally (10.5%), 
with alcohol production at the top of a long list of processing activities (cassava in flour, 
palm nuts in oil, cereals in various products, smoked fish, soy in milk and derivatives, etc.). 
Animal raising is more important than in other regions (4.5%), and is dominated by poultry 
and pigs. 
Overall, agricultural borrowers in the North specialize mostly in crop production while 
in the Center, production and trade dominate; and in the South, production and processing 
are the farming main activities.  
 
3.4.2.Stochastic profit frontier estimation 
The first step is the estimation of a stochastic translog profit function, which represents 
the best-practice technology against which the efficiency of the borrowing farmers can be 
measured. The results are presented in table 3.2. Following Kumbhakar et al. (1991), the 
specification includes direct estimation of determinants of profit efficiency along with the 
parameters of the frontier model. To capture regional heterogeneity, the profit frontier is 
estimated per studied region: the North, the Center and the South. 
Prior to the profit frontier estimation, a likelihood ratio test of the presence of an 
inefficiency component in the model is performed. The test’s null hypothesis is H0: 𝜎𝑢
2 = 0 
against the alternative hypothesis H1: 𝜎𝑢
2 > 0. If the null hypothesis is true, then the 
stochastic frontier model reduces to the classical Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model with 
normal errors. In the specification combining all regions as well as in the specifications for 
the North and the South, the null hypothesis is rejected, indicating that a significant part of 
the variability in profits among agricultural borrowers is explained by existing differences 
in efficiency levels. The estimation of a stochastic profit function is therefore justified. 
However, in the Center, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
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Furthermore, the variance ratio parameter, λ = 𝜎𝑢/𝜎𝑣, proposed by Battese and 
Corra (1977) is greater than 0 and relatively large (λ = 2.21 in the North, λ = 0.78 in the 
Center, and λ = 1.65 in the South). This result implies that deviations from the maximum 
profit among agricultural borrowers in the North and the South stemmed from differences 
in producer practices rather than random variability (λ > 1). In the Center, however, λ is 
different than zero but less than unity indicating that the idiosyncratic component 
dominates in the determination of the error term. There is some inefficiency but the 
differences in profit among borrowers in the Center is prominently caused by random 
factors outside the farmers’ control.  
The sum of all parameters of the profit frontier model is lower than unity 
(∑ 𝛽𝑗 < 1𝑗 ) in all regions indicating that borrowers operates with diminishing returns to 
scale technology. In the South, both the increase in labor and other variable inputs are 
positively and significantly associated with increase in output and profit. Across all 
regions, other variable inputs (capital) significantly and positively affect the profit.  
Recall, labor cost includes the value of in-kind and cash payments to hired laborers. 
A variable indicating whether respondents report no labor expenditure has been included 
in the inefficiency model. The statistically insignificant coefficient on that variable in the 
North and the Center implies that profit does not really change when no labor expense is 
reported. In fact, one can consider hired labor in this case as an indicative of the size of the 
farm operation in those two regions–descriptive statistics show that borrowers in those 
areas use mostly family labor: respectively 93.85% and 92.12% in the North and the 
Center. A Probit regression of labor expenditure report shows that small farmers with less 
capital do not hire any labor in those regions. Conversely in the South, where borrowers 
employ mostly paid labor, the coefficient on the variable indicating that respondents report 
no labor expenditure is positive and statistically significant. This result denotes that in the 
South, labor expenditure is a significant share of the total cost such that farmers who do 
not pay for labor in kind or in cash have higher profits. 
A dummy variable for whether the sampled borrower belongs to a family of native 
or first comer in the area displays a positive and significant coefficient in the Center and in 
the South. This variable has been included in the model essentially to capture land 
resourcefulness. In the South and the Center where land resources are scarcer than the 
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North, it makes sense that natives who own more land see a significantly positive effect on 
their profit efficiency. In the Center and the South, specialization seems to improve profit 
efficiency–the coefficient on the number of activities is negative in both regions but 
statistically significant in the South only. 
Surprisingly, the joint estimation of the frontier model and the efficiency factors 
indicates inconclusive results on the relation between efficiency and household size or 
family labor force. 
In the Center, gender significantly affects the efficiency of the borrowers. In fact, 
ceteris paribus, female agricultural borrowers are more efficient than male ones. They 
possess less assets than male borrowers do, but they utilize their resources more optimally. 
This result is very interesting and has important policy implications. It confirms previous 
studies’ finding and the belief in the development arena that, policies targeting (rural) 
women tend to be more effective. Resources or more specifically, money placed in 
women’s hand seems to have bigger effect, not only on the household as demonstrated 
previously (e.g. Thomas (1990)), but also on the farm. Put differently, the result supports 
the recommendation that development program should target women because they tend to 
be more efficient in resources use. 
Surprisingly, the number of years of education has a negative effect on efficiency 
in most regions. The coefficient is only statistically significant in the South. This result can 
be explained by the fact that, the more educated the borrowers are, the more they tend to 
practice farming as their secondary activity and therefore, are less efficient at it. For 
instance, several respondents in the sample are school teachers or civil servants living in 
rural areas and conducting some farming activities for additional income. The negative 
sign on the coefficient of the number of income generating activities, even though it is not 
statistically significant, supports this explanation. 
 
3.4.3. Profit efficiency scores 
The stochastic profit function model permits to uncover efficiency scores of 
agricultural borrowers. These efficiency score are summarized in table 3.3. Recall, the 
closer the efficiency scores are to the unity the more efficient the farmer is. On average, 
farmers’ efficiency level is about 41% in the North, 57% in the Center and 44% in the 
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South. In general, sampled borrowers display low levels of profit efficiency denoting that 
their farm as a whole could be about twice as profitable as it is. 
The survey data help to better understand the different mechanisms contributing to 
the different levels of efficiency per region. In the South, the most urbanized part of the 
country, as well as in the North, the region with the highest agricultural production, 
borrowers invest substantially in mechanized production equipment as well as in 
transportation means40. In the South for instance, where farmers practice a lot of 
horticulture, loans are frequently used to acquire irrigation equipment; whereas in the 
North, sampled borrowers invest in tractors and land preparation machines. These 
technologies help farmers reach a certain level of efficiency in production by increasing 
their output (technical efficiency) but the cost associated with the investment into these 
technologies increase their cost of production (allocative inefficiency) in the short term 
studied. Consequently, in the North and the South the profit efficiency scores are the 
lowest. In the Center, the investment in agricultural machines is moderate but hired labor 
is predominant. Labor costs are often lower expenditure compared to machines and 
equipment making sampled farmers in the Center more cost efficient in the short-term 
given the technology used, compared to those in the North and the South. This result 
validates the previous result that differences in profit in the Center is mostly caused by 
random factors.  
 
3.4.4. Agricultural loans and efficiency 
To assess the impact of agricultural loans on farmers’ efficiency, the study employs 
a treatment-effects model. A treatment effect is the change in an outcome caused by a 
subject, here the agricultural borrower that receives a treatment instead of another. Three 
main conditions underlie the use of treatment-effects estimators–the conditional-
independence (CI) assumption, the overlap assumption and the independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) sampling assumption. 
The CI assumption ensures that the potential outcomes are conditionally 
independent of the treatment and that no unobservable variable affect both treatment 
                                                 
40 Results from the previous chapter (Chapter 2) demonstrates this statement. 
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assignment and the potential outcomes, after conditioning on the observed covariates 𝑧. 
Stated simply, under the CI assumption, there is selection on observables. To ensure that 
the CI assumption is met, the study chooses a set of covariates that jointly determine the 
selection process and the efficiency level of the borrowers’ farm. Also, given the sampling 
framework and the identification strategy, one can argue that there are no unobserved 
confounders or if any, potentially the morality of the client or her trustworthiness, they are 
highly correlated with the covariates included in the model. Finally, there is a high degree 
of post-match balance across the covariates. In fact, the box plots of matched data depicted 
in figure 3.2 (North), figure 3.3 (Center) and figure 3.4 (South) indicate covariate balance. 
Kernel density plots using the matched data also suggest balance. 
The overlap assumption requires that each individual have a positive probability of 
receiving each treatment level. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) call the combination of the 
CI and the overlap assumptions strong ignorability. To check whether the overlap 
assumption is violated, the estimated densities of the probability of getting each treatment 
level are plotted. Figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 display the estimated densities of the predicted 
probabilities that an unexperienced borrower is unexperienced and the density of the 
predicted probabilities that an experienced borrower is unexperienced, respectively in the 
North, the Center and the South. The graphs show that the two estimated densities have 
most of their respective masses in areas in which they overlap each other, and in all cases, 
neither plot display most of its probability mass near 0 or 1. There is no evidence, therefore, 
that the overlap assumption is violated. 
The propensity score matching estimator is subsequently implemented and the 
propensity scores are modeled using a logistic model, incorporating covariates such as age, 
age square, gender, status in the household, education level, household size, assets, income, 
proximity to a FECECAM branch, number of income generating activities, land 
availability, and migration experience. Treated borrowers are matched to three control 
borrowers with the closest propensity scores due to the higher number of control subjects 
(almost three-fold). 
After matching treated and untreated borrowers based on their propensity scores, 
i.e. their predicted probabilities to be treated, the average treatment effects and average 
treatment effect on the treated estimates have been elicited.  
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The matching results are summarized in table 3.4. Profit efficiency scores derived 
from models estimated per region are the outcome variable in the estimation of the ATE as 
well as the ATET. Section 3.3.3. earlier discussed the relevance of each statistic estimated. 
Even though the result table report both the ATE and the ATET, the latter is the most 
relevant figure in the case of this study. Though, the ATE shows that experience with loan 
clearly has the potential to significantly increase the whole-farm efficiency of borrowers 
by 3%, 2% and 5% respectively for those located in the North, the Center, and the South. 
The statistic of interest, the ATET gives mixed results. In the North, farmers with 
extensive experience with loan–loan experience according to the study is detailed in section 
1.5.3.–significantly improved their whole-farm efficiency by 3.5%. This number is very 
similar to the ATE obtained in the region and also similar to the difference in means from 
the t-test, even though that difference (4%) was not statistically significant. In the Center, 
ATET has a negative sign and is statistically significant. This surprising result could be 
due to the small number of treated subjects in that region (only 33 experienced borrowers 
versus 181 control). In fact, in the Center, even though the overlap and CI assumptions are 
met, the match balance or overlap degrees are still low. Also, the frontier estimation 
showed that in the Center, differences in profit are predominantly caused by random factors 
out of farmers’ control. In the South, the ATET is not statistically significant even though 
it has a positive sign implying that loan experience may improve borrowers’ whole farm 
efficiency. 
It is noteworthy that the frontier estimation shows that sampled borrowers located 
in the North and the South have the lowest profit efficiency scores whereas the matching 
results reveal that borrowers located in those regions have the highest gain in efficiency 
from loan experience.  
Overall, judging by the ATET, matching results indicate that the use of agricultural 
loans significantly increase the profit efficiency levels of experienced borrowers 
particularly in the North. Even though the change in efficiency is small, it has some 
important financial implications for the borrowers. In fact, these results put into perspective 
mean that over the six-years period studied (2012-2017), borrowers who received on 
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average four times ( 1.77 times) an average amount of loan of 1,126,000 FCFA41 ( 
1,2630,000 FCFA) improved their whole-farm profit efficiency by 3.5% on average for 
those located in the North. In that region where the mean farm profit for the 2016-2017 
agricultural season is 2,062,000 FCFA ( 4,797,800 FCFA), the improvement in efficiency 
represents a yearly gain in profit of 72,170 FCFA ( 167,923 FCFA). This gain is quite 
significant in a country like Benin where 40.1% of the population live below the poverty 
line (The World Bank, 2016).  
The results of the study clearly indicate that FECECAM’s loans not only help 
borrowers become better farmers but also improve their resource allocation.  
 
3.5.  Implications and Conclusion 
The performance of the agricultural sector has a key role to play in the sustainable 
economic development of African countries. Yet, intensification and modernization 
typically require capital, which is not often available to farmers. The lack of capital 
represents a significant constraint to the development of the agricultural sector. The goal 
of this chapter is to gauge the effectiveness of agricultural credit programs as a policy tool 
for increasing the income and the productivity of farmers. More specifically, the chapter 
examines the effect of agricultural loans on input allocation decisions and farm 
profitability. It evaluates the impact of agricultural loans on the whole-farm efficiency of 
borrowers in Benin. The analysis exploits differences in loan take-up timing, frequency 
and amount received as the source of identification of the effects of agricultural loans 
provided by the largest microfinance instiution in Benin (FECECAM). 
Using primary data on the clients of FECECAM, this chapter, first, estimates a 
farm-level stochastic profit frontier. The results of the frontier analysis reveal, among other 
things, that even though (or, perhaps, because) rural women own fewer assets than their 
male counterparts, they are made more efficient by loans in their resource allocation. This 
result supports the fact that development programs targeting women have bigger effect. 
Next, the frontier function allows the estimation of borrowers’ profit efficiency 
scores, which is an aggregate measure of technical and allocative efficiency. The estimated 
                                                 
41 About 2,000 USD 
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average profit efficiency is about 41% in the North, 57% in the Center and 44% in the 
South, denoting the presence of significant technical and allocative errors leading to profit 
loss in all studied regions. Sampled borrowers’ farm could be about twice as profitable as 
it is. In light of the survey and the previous chapter, the chapter discusses the mechanisms 
explaining the differences across regions in efficiency levels. Farmers located in North and 
the South have the lowest average efficiency scores due to higher costs of production (take 
loan for machines and equipment purchase) while borrowers in the Center are able to keep 
their production cost low by using hired labor. In all regions, FECECAM loans help 
borrowers obtain inputs and technology they need to increase their production. 
 Then, propensity score matching technique helps compare the efficiency scores of 
experienced borrowers to inexperienced ones, providing a measure of the marginal effect 
of loan experience. The ATE shows that experience with loan clearly has the potential to 
significantly increase the whole-farm efficiency of borrowers by 3%, 2% and 5% 
respectively for those located in the North, the Center, and the South. The two regions with 
the lowest efficiency scores have the highest (potential) gain in profit efficiency. 
Considering the sampled farmers who are actually treated, experience with loan 
significantly increase their efficiency particularly in the North, leading to a yearly gain in 
profit of about 72,170 FCFA. 
 These results have important policy implications. First, results suggest that there 
are significant inefficiencies in the way farmers allocate resources to their farming 
activities. Furthermore, the use of agricultural loans in Benin clearly helps farmers improve 
their productivity and profitability. The study provides a proof of the effectiveness of 
agricultural credit programs and shows that agricultural loans have the potential to improve 
farmer’s livelihoods.  
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Chapter 3 Tables and figures  
Table 3.1: Summary statistics by region 
 (North) (Center) (South) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Farm production variables       
Farm profit (100,000 FCFA) 20.622 47.978 43.957 143.848 33.084 103.925 
Labor a cost (100,000 FCFA) 1.197 2.048 1.577 3.015 2.868 6.071 
Other variable input cost (100,000 FCFA) 7.481 9.938 7.237 40.580 9.518 27.603 
Other variables       
Age (years) 42.848 11.513 41.530 11.697 46.214 10.111 
Gender (Female =0; Male=1) 0.725 0.447 0.594 0.492 0.715 0.452 
Household head (Yes=1; No=0) 0.674 0.470 0.629 0.484 0.757 0.430 
Belong to a family of native or first comers in the area (Yes=1; 
No=0) 
0.674 0.470 0.522 0.501 0.456 0.499 
Experience in conducting farm activities (Years) 17.063 11.158 17.164 10.617 22.622 11.007 
Years of schooling (Years) 1.887 3.492 2.924 4.308 5.430 6.132 
Length of (work) migration (Months) 5.934 24.117 12.769 42.490 11.561 32.754 
Household size (Count) 9.354 4.897 7.809 3.940 7.004 2.999 
Workforce available in the household (Adult equivalent) 3.387 2.236 2.910 1.612 2.506 1.423 
Number of income generating activities (Count) 3.191 1.325 2.667 1.131 2.435 1.034 
Land available to the household (Ha) 12.765 13.703 9.151 11.892 5.784 21.821 
Value of household durable goods owned (100,000 FCFA) 7.291 24.092 16.015 50.947 38.000 69.610 
Non-farm income in 2016-2017 (100,000 FCFA) 1.178 2.925 2.815 10.890 4.220 16.994 
Number of extension visits received (Count) 0.922 2.029 0.784 2.599 0.644 3.770 
Average loan taken between 2012 and 2017 (100,000 FCFA) 659.572 707.855 813.147 773.218 438.235 421.173 
Cost one-way trip to closest FECEAM branch (FCFA) 20.622 47.978 43.957 143.848 33.084 103.925 
a Labor cost includes the value of in-kind and cash payments to aids and workers for tasks undertaken during crop production, 
processing and trade of agricultural products, and animal raising. 
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Table 3.2: Maximum Likelihood estimates of profit frontier function by region 
 (North) (Center) (South) 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Frontier variables       
Log labor cost 0.004 0.518 0.523 0.413 0.672** 0.335 
Log other variable inputs cost 0.511*** 0.100 0.392*** 0.075 0.353*** 0.071 
Log other variable inputs cost 
square 
0.053 0.039 0.112*** 0.026 -0.050** 0.025 
Log labor cost square 0.090 0.276 0.081 0.161 -0.169 0.153 
Log labor cost x Log other 
variable inputs cost 
-0.186 0.214 -0.312** 0.137 0.120 0.083 
Inefficiency covariates       
Report no labor expenditure 
(Yes=1; No=0) 
-0.254 0.186 0.257 0.220 0.806*** 0.267 
Age  0.050 0.040 -0.013 0.048 -0.003 0.069 
Age square -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Gender (Female =0; Male=1) 0.000 0.252 -1.055*** 0.274 0.170 0.322 
Household head (Yes=1; No=0) -0.245 0.234 0.728*** 0.286 -0.683** 0.336 
Belong to a family of native or 
first comers (Yes=1; No=0) 
-0.060 0.173 0.437*** 0.174 0.324* 0.192 
Experience in conducting farm 
activities 
0.006 0.010 0.018 0.015 0.007 0.012 
Years of schooling -0.020 0.022 0.021 0.022 -0.031* 0.017 
Length of (work) migration -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
Household size -0.029 0.019 0.081** 0.034 0.027 0.042 
Family workforce used in the 
household in 2017 (Adult 
equivalent) 
0.001 0.045 -0.130 0.089 -0.003 0.081 
Number of income generating 
activities 
0.027 0.062 -0.059 0.089 -0.231** 0.097 
Land available to the household 0.011* 0.006 0.012 0.009 0.000 0.004 
Value of household durable 
goods owned  
0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Non-farm income 0.030 0.028 0.013 0.016 0.003 0.016 
Number of extension agent 
visits received  
0.014 0.048 -0.001 0.032 -0.013 0.020 
Constant 1.872** 0.948 2.153* 1.137 3.918** 1.681 
Variance parameters       
Sigma_v (𝜎𝑣) 0.693 0.085 1.090 0.153 0.837 0.137 
Sigma_u (𝜎𝑢) 1.529 0.151 0.850 0.524 1.380 0.263 
Sigma2 (𝜎2= 𝜎𝑢
2+ 𝜎𝑣
2) 2.818 0.401 1.911 0.604 2.605 0.556 
Lambda (λ = 𝜎𝑢/𝜎𝑣) 2.208 0.213 0.780 0.666 1.649 0.383 
Notes: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3.3: Efficiency scores and mean comparison by region 
 All 
Experienced 
(N=145) 
Inexperienced 
(N=529) 
Difference 
 Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err Mean Std. Err 
North 
(N=220) 
0.414 0.013 0.445 0.029 0.405 0.014 0.040 0.031 
Center 
(N=214) 
0.568 0.007 0.597 0.016 0.562 0.007 0.035* 0.018 
South 
(N=181) 
0.436 0.013 0.457 0.021 0.428 0.016 0.029 0.030 
Notes: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 3.4: Treatment effect estimates by region 
Region ATE ATET 
 Coefficient 
AI42 Robust 
Standard Errors 
Coefficient 
AI Robust 
Standard Errors 
North 0.030*** 0.003 0.035*** 0.006 
Center 0.023*** 0.001 -0.023*** 0.004 
South 0.048*** 0.004 0.007 0.008 
Notes: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
                                                 
42 Stands for Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors 
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Figure 3.1: Contribution of farming activities to farmers’ income 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Covariates balance diagnostic box plots and Kernel density plot using the 
matched data in the North 
- ATE estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- ATET estimation 
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Figure 3.3: Covariates balance diagnostic box plots and Kernel density plot using the 
matched data in the Center 
- ATE estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- ATET estimation 
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Figure 3.4: Covariates balance diagnostic box plots and Kernel density plot using the 
matched data in the South 
- ATE estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- ATET estimation 
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Figure 3.5: Estimated densities of predicted probabilities of getting each treatment level 
in the North (overlap check) 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Estimated densities of predicted probabilities of getting each treatment level in 
the Center (overlap check) 
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Figure 3.7: Estimated densities of predicted probabilities of getting each treatment level in 
the South (overlap check) 
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4. Impact of agricultural loans on farmers’ well being 
4.1. Introduction 
Given the importance of the agricultural sector in developing countries in general and 
in Africa in particular, the sustainable economic development in these countries are 
conditioned by the development of their agricultural sector. Limited access to financial 
services is known as a major constraint to agricultural development (FAO, 2002). Farmers 
need liquidity to face agricultural expenses throughout the production cycle but mainly at 
the beginning. Production, as well as investment decisions of most farmers, are greatly 
influenced by their access to financial instruments. 
Mainstream financial institutions are reluctant to serve the agricultural sector for 
several reasons. First, they consider the sector to be highly risky with a low performance. 
In addition, agricultural activities depend on the weather, they take place in remote rural 
areas, and commodities prices are volatile. All these aspects make it hard for standard 
banks to reach their profit goals when lending to farmers. 
Microfinance was initiated with the belief that access to credit has the potential to 
transform the lives of those living in poverty (Grameen Foundation, 2016; Village Invest, 
2016). In fact, microfinance, and more specifically microcredit has a dual mission: 
financial inclusion and poverty alleviation. In the past 20 years, the microfinance sector 
has experienced a rapid expansion, and the number of low-income households worldwide 
with a microloan has considerably grown. From 1997 to 2010, an eighteen-fold growth is 
recorded with an increase from 7.6 million to 137.5 million low-income families that 
received a microloan (MSC, 2012). 
However, evidence of the effectiveness of microfinance is still unclear. The literature 
shows discrepancies between what microcredit ought to do theoretically and empirical 
evidence. For instance, evidence from Cambodia suggest that microcredit may be most 
appropriately conceptualized as a coping strategy instead of a poverty alleviation one 
because borrowers perceive loans as useful in coping with household vulnerability, but not 
transforming it (Bylander, 2015). In fact, microcredit opponents often argue that borrowers 
would use microloans for consumption instead of investment in profitable activities, 
resulting in repayment default, debt, and ultimately worsening the conditions of the 
borrowers. More, farmers in developing countries face significant risk constraints along 
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with capital constraints. If lack of access to credit can limit farmers’ investment in activities 
with higher profits, lack of access to formal insurance market can also prevent farmers 
from investing in activities that may be risky, but have high expected returns (Cai, Chen, 
Fang, and Zhou, 2015; Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto, and Udry, 2014). Furthermore, if the 
funding of the agricultural sector must come from both the private and public sectors, it is 
essential to demonstrate its value empirically, and provide reliable figures on the impact of 
microfinance programs on agricultural clients’ living standards. Only, past studies on the 
impact of credit suggest opposing results. On the one hand, studies show that microfinance 
does help the poor improve their productivity or their well-being and enables them to pull 
out of poverty (Girabi and Mwakaje, 2013; Pitt and Khandker, 1998). On the other hand, 
other studies claim that evidence supporting the positive impact of microfinance 
interventions are thin and lack rigor (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan, 2014; 
Roodman and Morduch, 2014). 
The goal of this chapter of the dissertation is to assess whether agricultural loans work 
as expected. The section estimates the impact of agricultural loans provided by the largest 
microloan provider in Benin on farmers’ wellbeing. It tests the hypothesis that experience 
with microcredit improves the well-being of the borrowers. 
A simple model is developed to demonstrate how the allocation of agricultural loans to 
the different needs of the recipient is a key determinant of how microloans affect the 
livelihoods of their users. The model argues that to uncover an effect from microcredit, 
loans have to be used for their purposes and suitable variables related to those purposes 
need to be measured. It is possible that several studies which found no or negative impact 
from microcredit use may have either missed the loan repurposing aspect, chosen the 
wrong outcome variables or may have actually measured the effect of a “misuse” of loans. 
The study employs four variables to gauge borrower’s well-being. The average impact 
of loan experience is estimated on borrowers’ net farm income gained during the 
agricultural season 2016-17. Net farm income is calculated as the sum of all revenues from 
farm activities and farm-related services less cash and non-cash expenses. In addition, the 
impact of FECECAM farm loans on recipients’ nutritional and food security status is 
estimated. Borrowers nutritional status is measured using the Food Consumption Score 
(FCS) and their food security status is assessed by the Food Insecurity Experience Scale 
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(FIES). Finally, the study takes a look at the specific impact of agricultural loans on rural 
women using the composite and multidimensional indicator WEAI–women’s 
empowerment in agriculture index. 
Overall, the analysis shows that farm loans provided by FECECAM has a positive and 
significant impact on borrower’s well-being. Female borrowers experience higher positive 
impact of the loans compared to male. 
 
4.2. Theoretical framework 
4.2.1.MFIs’ strategy and expected impact of microcredit 
When providing microloans, the strategy used by an MFI might greatly affect users’ 
perception of the loans and even the outcomes. Several studies, in fact, showed that 
borrowers sometimes perceive loans from governmental institutions or development 
programs as gifts and therefore fail to repay. For instance, studies by Houngan, (2015) and 
Mazumder and Lu, (2015) indicated respectively in Benin and in Bangladesh that, 
microcredit effects are consistently higher among non-governmental recipients compared 
to governmental programs. FECECAM is a cooperative established since 1977, which has 
substantial experience in credit disbursement. Over time, the lender has improved and 
adjusted its loan programs’ implementation. FECECAM offers loans for specific purposes 
and has a strict monitoring mechanism to ensure that borrowers use loans for their stated 
purposes. After a thorough screening process for selection, the MFI ensures that borrowers 
are actually using the loan for the initial activities through multiple site visits. These actions 
ensure the selection of “good borrowers”, the good use of the loan provided but are also 
deployed to guarantee a high repayment rate and the success of the programs.  
Furthermore, a mandatory business management class is offered to all borrowers after 
they are approved for a loan. Some branches offer technical assistance to the borrowers 
depending on their activities, especially to women’s lending groups. During the loan 
application, the farmer and the credit agent make a farm business plan as well as a home 
plan for the coming agricultural season. As discussed earlier in the dissertation, these 
practices make FECECAM loan programs very similar to supervised credit programs. 
Farmers are provided loans but are also overseen and supported throughout the process. In 
those conditions, one can expect an extended use of agricultural loans from FECECAM to 
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have the expected outcomes on the users’ socio-economic conditions. These empirical 
observations lay the foundation for a discussion on loans expected impact. 
 
4.2.2. Microloan allocation as determinant of its impact 
Let’s consider a farm borrower who manages his economic activities within a farm 
household. In general, farmers are concerned about production as they are about 
consumption. An agricultural loan, even though received for a specific purpose, still 
represents an increase in borrowers’ total cash, given that money is fungible. Thus, 
agricultural loans temporarily relax recipients’ budget constraint. Suppose the borrower is 
faced with only two choices. He/she can either use the loan for increasing productivity or 
use it for consumption smoothing43. How the loan is allocated to his/her needs, as a result, 
is a function of the farmer’s most pressing needs. In fact, loans provide our agent with the 
facility to absorb random shocks in his income, and therefore prevent these shocks from 
being transmitted into variations in consumption. Consequently, borrowers with more 
assets are more likely to use their loan for increasing productivity as they will first use their 
assets to cushion random income shocks while those with fewer assets are prone to 
repurpose their loans towards consumption smoothing. In other words, we expect 
borrowers with higher ability to pool risks across time to spend their loans towards 
production instead of consumption smoothing. The central assumption here is that 
agricultural loans have a positive impact or increase long-term productivity when they are 
actually used towards their stated purpose, holding everything else constant (markets 
access, extension services, weather, skills, and other factors). Accordingly, if agricultural 
loans are working as expected, one should not expect an immediate short-term increase in 
consumption, but rather a sustained increase in production which will eventually entail a 
sustained increased consumption afterward. 
Moreover, if agricultural loans, which are offered for increasing productivity, are 
used instead for patching consumption, one can argue that borrowers become less likely to 
produce the additional output needed to cover the additional charges represented by the 
                                                 
43 For simplicity, production here includes both the direct use of loans for inputs purchase as well as 
productive investments. Also, we ignore the case where loans could be given or shared with friends or 
relatives.  
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interest rate and the initial loan to be repaid. Consequently, if agricultural loans do not lead 
to increased production, the repayment aspect of the loans become very burdensome for 
borrowers who might even avoid taking loans for that reason. It follows that, ceteris 
paribus, if agricultural loans are used for consumption smoothing, one can expect a higher 
default risk. 
 
4.2.3. Conceptual role of agricultural credit  
At the individual level, an agricultural loan is expected lead to an immediate 
increase in the use of inputs (land, capital, labor) toward agricultural activities or more 
specifically toward the activity for which the loan had been taken. Given that certain inputs 
such as fertilizers or new machines benefit various operations within the farm household, 
one can expect a positive impact on borrower’s net farm income. Following a classical 
production theory, a logical hypothesis is that an agricultural loan relaxes the budget 
constraint facing the farmers and allows them to efficiently allocate factors of production 
to maximize their profit. Overall, the anticipated pathway of the effects of FECECAM 
loans at the individual level is the following. Agricultural loans allocated toward increasing 
productivity is likely to stimulate a growth in the activity for which the loan is taken. The 
income from this activity is prone to affect other activities of the borrower (growth, 
substitution) and in total, these changes over time affect the accumulation of capital, 
knowledge, technologies, economic and social links, and thus the borrower’s total income 
(farm and non-farm). This income will be partly allocated to productive investments and 
in the long-term to household durable goods acquisition. Hence, for variables such as farm 
size, labor use44, productive assets accumulation, inputs expenses per farm area (hectare), 
and net farm income, our model predicts an immediate sustained increase. 
Furthermore, most microfinance programs target women with the goal to empower 
them. The idea of promoting women’s empowerment by the provision of credit is not only 
based on the assumption that women’s involvement in economic activities will strengthen 
their social and political position, but also on the evidence that credit to women has a 
positive impact on child welfare, girls’ schooling and food security. Our model also permits 
                                                 
44 The case of labor use will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
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predictions of the effects of microloans on women’s empowerment. In this study, the 
definition of empowerment follows Kabeer (1999). One can argue that the women’s 
empowerment in agriculture index employed in the study is a good composite and 
multidimensional index to assess whether agricultural loans are actually increasing long-
term productivity in the special case of women in agriculture. In fact, the index takes into 
account five main aspects of rural women’s constraints: (i) autonomy in decision-making 
about their income generating activities; (ii) right over productive or household durable 
goods including their holding; (iii) autonomy in the decision to take out loans; (iv) public 
speaking and groups membership; and (v) the use of their time. For women who have 
borrowed for an extended period of time, agricultural loans should help them gain more 
autonomy and empowerment. 
Finally, the model predicts an increase in consumption in the long run, subsequent 
to an income rise, as a result of agricultural effectively increasing long-term productivity. 
Indicators of household’s food security and food quality are employed to test that 
assumption. Those who have borrowed for a longer period of time should display better 
figures of food security and food quality indexes. 
 
4.3. Impact estimation 
The objective of this chapter is to estimate the average causal effect of FECECAM 
loans on various indicators of borrowers’ well-being. Sections 1.5.2 and 1.5.3 respectively 
discuss threats to identifying causal effects in microcredit studies and how the research 
design and identification strategy addressed these threats. The research samples 
FECECAM agricultural loan users only and exploits the timing of their entry into the 
program along with their borrowing history with the MFI to construct reliable treatment 
and control groups using a clustering technique. The loan treatment here is the experience 
with FECECAM loans as defined in section 1.5.3. 
To estimate the effect of loan experience on farmers’ well-being, the study uses a 
treatment-effects model. Four indicators serve to measure the well-being of borrowers: the 
net farm income, the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), the Food Consumption 
Score (FCS), and the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI). 
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Outcomes of treatment and control groups are compared using a propensity score 
matching technique, providing a measure of the marginal effect of loan experience. The 
propensity scores are computed using a logistic model. Given the ratio between 
experienced and inexperienced borrowers, each subject in a treatment group is matched to 
two borrowers with the closest propensity scores in the opposite group. 
The propensity score matching procedure is detailed in the previous chapter (see 
section 3.4.4). Figures 4.2-4.5 depict the box plots of match data as well as Kernel density 
plots using the matched data. Both graphs indicate in each case, a high or at least a 
satisfactory degree of post-match balance (the conditional independence assumption is 
met). Figures 4.6 to 4.9 display the estimated densities of the predicted probabilities that 
an unexperienced borrower is unexperienced and the density of the predicted probabilities 
that an experienced borrower is unexperienced, respectively in the case of the net farm 
income, the FIES, the FCS, and the WEAI specifications. The figures show that the overlap 
assumption is also met in all cases.  
In general, borrowers in the treatment group are matched to those in the control 
group based on selection criteria used by the lender as well as other factors drawn from the 
literature and relevant to each specific indicator studied. These covariates include age, 
gender, education, status in the farm household, work migration experiences as well as 
household structure including household size, workforce available in the household in adult 
equivalent. The covariates also involve characteristics such as the number of income 
generating activities, the years of experience conducting farming activities, proximity to a 
FECECAM service point as well as the location in an agricultural zone. Two treatment 
effects statistics are estimated: 
- The average treatment effect (ATE) measures the effect that a substantial experience 
with FECECAM loans would have had on the entire population of borrowers or what 
would have happened, had all borrowers been experienced ones. 
- The average treatment effect on the treated (ATET or ATT) estimates the effect of the 
treatment on those who received it, put differently, how much the well-being of the 
treatment group improved as a result of their experience with FECECAM loans.  
The previous chapter discusses the two statistics (see section 3.3.3) and argue that instead 
of using the marginal effect of FECECAM loans on the entire population (ATE), the effects 
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of FECECAM loans in its current state, on those who actually chose to participate (ATET) 
may be more informative. For the German Development Institute who commissioned this 
investigation, the ATET estimating the effects on those who actually choose to borrow is 
a better indicator of the effect of loan on efficiency compared to the ATE expressing the 
effects of loans in a hypothetical scenario where everyone in the population would borrow 
from FECECAM. In the case of a required vaccine for instance, the ATE would be more 
meaningful. 
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Loan repurposing and loan sharing 
As mentioned earlier, FECECAM has tailored its agricultural loans to meet the need 
of its clients. These farm loans are offered for specific purposes and the lender develops a 
firm monitoring mechanism to ensure that clients are implementing the stated initial 
purpose of the loan. Figure 4.1. displays the percentage of respondents who used their loans 
for reasons different than the one stated in their loan application. 
Overall, 23.4% of the loans received in 2017 were not used solely for the activity 
for which they were requested. Most “changes in the purpose” are in fact an extension of 
the use of the loans to more diversified agricultural or trade activities while some cases are 
due to health expenses, and others are diversions in the strict sense of the term. The practice 
of using a loan for extended agricultural activities is more frequent in the North (33.2% of 
the respondents) where loans taken for cotton for example will be used to finance all or 
other crops production. 
With regard to diversion from the initial object of the loan, 4% of the recipients 
shared their loan with others by becoming "resellers" (lenders) of money or promoters of 
young farmers’ groups. Some recipients say that when other people who borrow from them 
know that they also got a loan to fund them, they are more inclined to reimburse. Finally, 
some respondents took agricultural credit but used it to pay their children school fees and 
then paid back with revenues from their farming activities. 
Surprisingly, loan sharing among household members is less common: only 4.1% 
of male and 4.3% of female respondents did it. The perception that women are forced to 
share their loans with their spouses is therefore not entirely valid, at least in Benin case. 
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The sharing is often between father and son or among brothers, often working together and 
developing parallel autonomous activities. 
 
4.4.2. Impact of loans experience on net farm income 
The average impact of loan experience is estimated on borrowers’ net farm income 
gained during the agricultural season 2016-17. The net farm income is calculated as the 
sum of all revenues from crops, livestock, processing or sale of farm products, as well as 
farm-related services less cash and non-cash expenses. Expenses include the loan obtained 
and its interest, expenditures on feed, seeds, fertilizers, other inputs, rent, hired labor, and 
in-kind payment to workers and landlords.  
Table 4.1. compares the mean values of different farm characteristics variables of 
experienced and inexperienced borrowers. T-test results indicate that there is a statistically 
significant difference of 4,240,000 FCFA between experienced borrowers’ net farm 
income while matching results indicate smaller figures. The average treatment effect of 
loan experience on net farm income is 1,374,000 FCFA while the average treatment effect 
on the treated is 365,000 FCFA (table 4.2.). These figures suggest that farm loans provided 
by FECECAM not only have the potential to significantly improve the net farm income of 
borrowers but also have significantly improved this net farm income for sampled 
experienced borrowers during the studied agricultural season. In Benin where 40.1% of the 
population lived below the poverty line in 2015 (The World Bank, 2018) and where poverty 
is more prevalent in rural areas, these increase in net farm income represent significant 
additional gains for rural borrowers. 
Results also indicate that both the ATE and the ATET are higher for female borrowers 
compared to males. In fact, the effect of loan is 7 to 14 times higher for female borrowers. 
Female are often the most affected by poverty in general and in Benin in particular, and 
these results indicate that loans has the potential to alleviate that. This result is interesting 
and important for policy implication. It validates the hypothesis underlying development 
strategies that target women when it comes to loan programs. Also, if rural women who 
constitutes the most impoverished segment are shown to significantly improve their net 
income as a result of a sustained use of credit, then one can argue that agricultural loans 
have the potential to alleviate poverty. For male borrowers, these results mean that over 
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the six-years period studied (2012-2017), receiving on average four times ( 1.77 times) 
an average amount of loan of 1,126,000 FCFA45 ( 1,2630,000 FCFA) caused an increase 
of 386,000 FCFA in their net farm income after the loan is repaid with its interest while for 
female borrowers, this increase is nearly ten times higher (3,172,000 FCFA). 
By disaggregating the results per activity group such as crop production, livestock, 
processing and trade of farm products, results show a negative coefficient for female 
borrowers for crop denoting that with improved income, female tend to move away from 
growing crops and move toward sale and processing of farm products, where a positive 
coefficient is seen. 
Finally, taking into account regional heterogeneity shows farmers in the Center and 
the North have the highest gain in net farm income. 
 
4.4.3. Impact of loans experience on Food security and nutritional status 
Food security 
The study assesses the impact of FECECAM loans on recipients’ household food 
security status. To do so, a set of questions were asked to those in charge of the meal 
preparation in the household. Female sampled borrowers were directly asked these 
questions while the wives answered in the case of sampled male borrowers. These females 
are referred to as “cooking units’ heads”. 
In this study, the terms “cooking units” and “kitchens” refer to distinct food 
management and food preparation units within a household. This notion of a cooking unit 
is connected to the notion of “consumption community46” which Gastellu (1979) defines 
as the group of people involved in the depletion of part of the production for the purpose 
of rebuilding the labor force. Each of the cooking units has one or more heads who are 
usually the wives. They grow part of the food consumed in their kitchens and also receive 
transfers of food products from their spouse or the household head. Each cooking unit head 
is therefore responsible for a stock of food (or a granary) they manage. 
                                                 
45 About 2,000USD 
46 In his approach, Gastellu, (1979) argues that, the term "community" seems to be better suited than that of 
"unit" when it comes to studying economic mechanisms at the local level in African rural communities. 
According to him, the term “community” highlights the privileged exchanges that connect individuals from 
the same group. However, he acknowledges that the community is sometimes reduced to the unit. 
 91 
 More than half (53.48%) of the cooking unit heads indicated that they have 
experienced a lean period during the agricultural season 2016-17. Yet, it is rarely a matter 
of famine or severe shortage but rather unsatisfactory situations in quantity and quality 
(22.2%) or in quality only (37.4%). The duration of the post-harvest abundance spans an 
average of 25 weeks in the North, 22.7weeks in the Center and only 8weeks in the South 
where several borrowers do not grow their own food at all. However, lean periods are 
longer in the North compared to the South. 
Food insecurity is measured using the FIES score – Food Insecurity Experience 
Scale. A series of eight questions were asked, ranging from the feeling of worry about 
running out of food to the reality of the shortage that happens when a person stays at least 
one day without eating, due to the lack of resources. The more a person is worried or faced 
with food insecurity, the higher the score. This score is correlated with the subjective 
perception of the household food situation and therefore seems well standardized. 
Overall, sampled borrowers do not seem food insecure judging by the average FIES 
score of 1.98 ( 2.65). The average FIES score is lower in the North (1.64) compare to the 
Center and the South (2.00 and 3.23 respectively). Food insecurity experience may be 
lower in the North because the majority of the borrowers grow their own food. 
 Comparing the mean FIES scores (t-test) between treatment and control borrowers 
show that there is a small statistically significant difference of 0.50 points (table 4.3). In 
fact, when asked about their perception of the impact of FECECAM loans on their food 
security status, sampled borrowers believe that credit has had a positive effect on their food 
security situation. 
Table 4.4 summarizes ATE and ATET of FECECAM loans on borrowers’ 
household food security status. Matching results also indicate that FECECAM loans 
statistically significantly reduces the anxiety of food insecurity of borrowers, even if the 
effect is small. Recall, the lower the FIES scores the better whereas the more a person is 
worried or faced with food insecurity, the higher the score. 
 
Food quality assessment using the food consumption score 
 Food quality is assessed using the Food Consumption Score (FCS) developed by 
the World Food Program. The FCS score is calculated using the frequency of consumption 
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of different food groups consumed by the borrowers’ household during the seven days 
before the survey. Higher food consumption scores indicate a good and diversified diet. 
For illustration, there are five food groups commonly accepted and a person eats on average 
three meals a day. If all food groups are consumed at each meal during the seven days of 
the week, one should expect a food consumption score of 105. 
 Descriptive statistics indicate that the majority (86.06%) of the sampled borrowers 
has a diet of acceptable quality judging from a dietary diversity perspective while 13.94% 
have a poor diet. The average FCS is 48.79 (12.68). 
 Both means comparison test and matching results show that agricultural loans 
improve the diet of borrowers. The difference in FCS scores is moderate but statistically 
significant. The effect of loan experience on borrowers’ diet decreases from the North to 
the South, judging by the ATET. Borrowers in the North have statistically significantly 
improved their food consumption score by 7.42 points due to their experience with loans 
The effect of loan on female borrowers’ food quality is potentially three times higher 
than male’s judging by the ATE. 
 
4.4.4. Impact of loans experience on women empowerment  
Women accumulate most roles and tasks in rural households (Owitti, 2015; Pitcher, 
1996; Sow, 2010). They not only allocate their time to working on the household head’s 
field, but also manage their own productive activities on top of house chores. Women are 
engaged in caregiving and reproductive roles as well. Women’s empowerment is assessed 
by the women’s empowerment in agriculture index described earlier in the conceptual 
framework (section 4.2.3).  
The mean WEAI is the sample is 3.28 (0.52) which indicate that on average, 
sampled women have a good empowerment index. The highest possible empowerment 
index is 5. Some could argue that, only the fact that they are able to take loans is an 
indication of their empowerment status. However, getting loans is not enough to assess the 
empowerment status of woman in this content. The WEAI offers a good composite 
indicator of women’s empowerment status by including other aspect of rural women’s life 
such as the autonomy in decision-making about their income generating activities and 
 93 
about the use of their time, the right over productive or household durable goods including 
their holding, public speaking and groups membership. 
The majority (81.55%) of the sampled female borrowers declare that FECECAM 
loans have improved their status in their households. They believe that the loans received 
help them gain more respect from their husband, co-wives and in-laws. Female borrowers 
state that they have acquired financial autonomy, no longer wait for their husband to help 
them take care of themselves or the children. In fact, sometimes, husband and wife help 
each other. Other female respondents stress that they were able to overcome widowhood 
or marital separation or fill the gap of a missing household head thanks to credit. 
The analysis of actual computed WEAI indexes support the subjective evaluation of 
female borrowers’ status in their household and community, when they use agricultural 
loans. First, a mean comparison between treatment and control group indicates a very small 
positive effect of loan experience on women’s empowerment, even if that difference is not 
statistically significant. Then, matching results show that FECECAM loans significantly 
improve WEAI indexes of female experienced borrowers, had all female borrowers been 
experienced (ATE of 0.44). The statistic of interest, which is the average treatment effect 
on the treated also indicates that experience with FECECAM loan significantly increases 
the WEAI index of actual experienced respondents (ATET of 0.17). Agricultural loans 
therefore help improve women’s status in their household. This result is important and 
interesting from a policy standpoint. Targeting rural women in loan programs can and has 
actually improved their living conditions. FECECAM agricultural loan program has not 
only improve the income level of the female recipients but has helped them improved their 
status in their household and community by empowering them. 
Given the small number of female respondents (only 32% of the sample) and the even 
smaller number of female treated borrowers, it was not possible to perform the propensity 
score matching per studied area. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
The chapter estimated the average causal effect on the well-being of agricultural loans 
provided by the largest microlender in Benin. The analysis uses propensity score matching 
technique to compare the indicators of experienced borrowers to those of the 
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inexperienced. Experience with loan includes the borrower’s seniority captured by the time 
of first entry into the loan program, the average amount borrowed over the six-years period 
studied, and the number of loans obtained. 
Results indicate that farm loans have a significant impact on sampled recipients’ net 
farm income, food security and food quality statuses, and have a positive impact on 
women’s empowerment. In fact, over the six-years period studied (2012-2017), receiving 
on average four times ( 1.77 times) an average amount of loan of 1,126,000 FCFA ( 
1,2630,000 FCFA) created for experienced borrowers, a gain in net farm income of 
365,000 FCFA, a reduction in food insecurity anxiety by 0.24 points, an improvement in 
food consumption of 2.29 points, and for female borrowers, a gain of 0.17 points in their 
empowerment index. 
Therefore, loans significantly increased the net farm income of experienced 
borrowers and their household saw an improvement in their food consumption quality as 
well as in their food security status. Women not only improve their income levels as well, 
but were also able to improve their status in the household. Loans helped them accumulate 
assets, gain financial autonomy and better provide for their personal need as well as their 
children’s. 
Benin case thus indicates that agricultural loans has the potential to improve farmers 
condition and alleviate poverty, especially in rural areas. The results of this chapter have 
important policy implications. They validate the hypothesis underlying development 
strategies that target women when it comes to loan programs. The results also indicate that 
agricultural loans have the potential to alleviate poverty. FECECAM loans in Benin, 
significantly improved the income and the living conditions of the poorest group which is 
the women. However, it is noteworthy that the monitoring and implementation mechanism 
of FECECAM played a crucial role in the success of its loan. The lender’s program 
resembles a supervised credit program which had proven to be very effective around the 
world.  
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Chapter 4 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 4.1: Mean comparison (t-test) of farm characteristics between experienced and 
inexperienced borrowers 
Variables Experienced Inexperienced Difference 
Number of farming activities conducted 2.89 2.74 0.16 
Total farmed area (ha) 8.33 6.01 2.33*** 
Total farm revenue (100,000FCFA) 96.50 33.46 63.04*** 
Total farm expenditure (100,000FCFA) 20.81 7.11 13.70*** 
Total net farm income (100,000FCFA) 66.16.70 23.76 42.40*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 4.2: Average causal effect of credit experience on net farm income (100,000 FCFA) 
(Two-nearest-neighbors’ technique used) 
 ATE ATET 
All Borrowers 13.74*** 3.65** 
          - Female 41.97*** 31.72*** 
          - Male -2.27*** 3.86*** 
North -0.01 7.27*** 
Center -21.17*** 10.50* 
South -14.04*** -2.59 
Notes: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Mean comparison (t-test) of food security, food quality and empowerment 
statuses between experienced and inexperienced borrowers 
Variables Experienced Inexperienced Difference 
Food Insecurity Experience Scale 1.58 2.08 -0.50* 
Food Consumption Score 53.97 47.47 6.50*** 
Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index 3.36 3.26 0.09 
Notes: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4.4: Average causal effect of experience with farm loan on food security status (FIES 
score) (Two-nearest-neighbors’ technique used) 
 ATE ATET 
All Borrowers -0.69*** -0.24*** 
          - Female -1.65*** -0.43*** 
          - Male -1.04*** -1.00*** 
North -0.37*** -0.30*** 
Center -0.60*** -1.48*** 
South -1.28*** 1.44*** 
 
Table 4.5: Average causal effect of experience with farm loan on food quality (FCS) (Two-
nearest-neighbors’ technique used) 
 ATE ATET 
All Borrowers 3.73*** 2.29*** 
          - Female 10.88*** 1.32 
          - Male 3.99*** 3.89*** 
North 5.38*** 7.42*** 
Center 7.86*** 3.31*** 
South 4.80*** 2.82*** 
 
Table 4.6: Average causal effect of experience with farm loan women’s empowerment 
(WEAI) (Two-nearest-neighbors’ technique used) 
 ATE ATET 
All Borrowers 0.44*** 0.17*** 
North   
Center   
South   
Given the small number of female respondent per region, there was not sufficient information to estimate 
the ATE and the ATET per region. 
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Figure 4.1: Shares of loan repurposed by region (%) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Covariates balance diagnostic box plots and Kernel density plot using the 
matched data (Net farm income) 
- ATE estimation 
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- ATET estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Covariates balance diagnostic box plots and Kernel density plot using the 
matched data (Food Insecurity Experience Scale) 
- ATE estimation 
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- ATET estimation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Covariates balance diagnostic box plots and Kernel density plot using the 
matched data (Food Consumption Score) 
- ATE estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- ATET estimation 
 
 
 
  
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Raw Matched
control treated
P
ro
p
e
n
si
ty
 S
co
re
 
Balance plot
P
ro
p
e
n
s
it
y
 s
c
o
re
 
0
2
4
6
0 .5 1 0 .5 1
Raw Matched
 control  treated
D
e
n
s
it
y
Propensity Score
 
Balance plot
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Raw Matched
control treated
P
ro
p
e
n
si
ty
 S
co
re
 
Balance plot
P
ro
p
e
n
s
it
y
 s
c
o
re
 
0
2
4
6
0 .5 1 0 .5 1
Raw Matched
 control  treated
D
e
n
s
it
y
Propensity Score
 
Balance plot
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Raw Matched
control treated
P
ro
p
e
n
s
it
y
 S
c
o
re
 
Balance plot
P
ro
p
e
n
s
it
y
 s
c
o
re
 
0
2
4
6
0 .5 1 0 .5 1
Raw Matched
 control  treated
D
e
n
s
it
y
Propensity Score
 
Balance plot
 100 
Figure 4.5: Covariates balance diagnostic box plots and Kernel density plot using the 
matched data (Women Empowerment in Agriculture Index) 
- ATE estimation 
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Figure 4.6: Overlap check for matching – Net farm income 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Overlap check for matching – FIES score 
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Figure 4.8: Overlap check for matching – FCS score 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Overlap check for matching – WEAI 
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General conclusion and discussion 
In development economics, a basic hypothesis is that more capital inputs are 
needed, not only at the aggregate level but also at the individual producer level to improve 
the agricultural sector (Colyer and Jimenez, 1971). Microfinance, and more specifically, 
microcredit programs, have been supported as sustainable interventions with the potential 
to alleviate poverty (Pankhurst and Johnston, 1999). However, the allocation of investment 
funds to farmers, especially those located in rural areas, is quite challenging. For capital to 
be effectively used by farmers, it is essential to invest in human capital and correct 
deficiencies in farmers’ capability (Colyer and Jimenez, 1971). In developed countries such 
as the United-States of America, supervised credit programs had proven to help battle 
chronical poverty in rural areas (Roberts, 2013). FECECAM the largest microlender in 
Benin has been providing loans to farmers and non-farmers since 1977. Over time, the 
lender has improved and adjusted its loan programs’ implementation. The Federal German 
Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), through the German 
Financial Cooperation (KfW), has refinanced FECECAM in its effort to supporting rural 
credit in general and agricultural credit in particular and is interested in furthering their 
support to the lender. Though before, the KfW wants to examine the merit of supporting 
the provision of loans to the rural world. The goal of this study commissioned and funded 
by the KfW is to evaluate the impact of agricultural loans on the livelihoods of recipients.  
Impact evaluation in the case of microcredit programs is often challenging due to 
two levels of selection: self-selection into a microfinance program by the borrowers, and 
the screening process of the microfinance institution. To address these biases, this study 
employs the so-called pipeline design, which is typically used in a cross-sectional setting 
in the absence of fully randomized experiments. This approach is justified by the fact that 
both its control and treatment groups consist of individuals who have chosen to participate 
in the microfinance program, addressing these two major sources of selection bias. Giving 
the relatively long period studied, the analysis has been innovative in defining the loan 
treatment along with creating reliable treatment groups. The loan treatment considered is 
the experience with loans which includes program entry timing, loan take-up frequency 
and the average amount of loan obtained over the 2012-2017’s period. To create reliable 
comparable groups, the study employs a cluster analysis technique.  
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To assess the impact of FECECAM loans on clients’ livelihoods, multiple variables 
and indicators are analyzed. The dissertation starts by providing a descriptive analysis of 
the impact of farm loans on farmer’s labor use. The impact of loan is often discussed at the 
recipient level but the second chapter of the dissertation looks beyond. It examines the role 
of agricultural loans in farmers’ labor input choice. The effect of farm credit on 
employment is of great importance, not only for the farmers themselves but also at the 
macroeconomic level. The results of the chapter show that impact of agricultural loans on 
labor is quite mixed. It suggests that past loans, clearly have residual effects on both hired 
and family labor use. However, loans specifically obtained for farm machinery 
significantly reduce expenditure on hired labor but more family labor is employed using 
machine loans while other loan categories reduced the use of family labor. Results from 
the chapter also bring up the question of the growing scarcity of labor force in rural areas, 
which is due to multiple reasons including rural flight but positive ones such as increased 
children schooling. Taking into account regional heterogeneities in the analysis of the 
chapter offers interesting perspectives. In areas where labor is more expensive, and farm 
areas are larger (North), farmers invest more in agricultural machines or technologies and 
employ more family labor. In areas with affordable and better labor availability, farmers 
increase their expenditure on hired labor. Certainly, loan availability made it possible for 
recipients to invest in technologies and agricultural machines to avoid exhausting manual 
work. 
The third chapter of the dissertation evaluates the impact of agricultural loans on 
the whole-farm efficiency of borrowers. Beyond the monetary benefit of loans, this chapter 
examines the potential human capacity building and the knowledge gaining aspect of 
extended exposure to loan programs such as FECECAM’s. Because rural finance programs 
are subsidized using limited taxpayer money, it is necessary to evaluate how they affect 
the marginal productivity of recipients. Results from chapter 3 indicate that lack of funds 
is not the most critical problem faced by most farmers in developing countries such as 
Benin. Adams and von Pischke (1991) reached the same conclusion. Even though sampled 
farmers have had a relatively long period of access to credit and loan take-up, they still 
display low levels of profit efficiency–the ability to produce the highest possible output at 
the lowest cost. Land tenure, lack of extension services, low yields, modern inputs 
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availability and costs, output prices, risk, and weather turn out to be more critical factors 
limiting farmers’ productivity and development. The third chapter also shows that the 
monitoring, the technical assistance, and the training that accompany FECECAM’s loan 
program may be instrumental, perhaps the key to the results. In most branches, the lender 
offers tailored technical support to its clients, depending on their activities, once they are 
approved for a loan. Female lending groups receive special attention and assistance from 
the cooperative. FECECAM also offers specific and targeted loans and deploys a rigorous 
monitoring mechanism to ensure that loans are correctly being utilized. To guarantee a high 
repayment rate (93.87% as of December 2017), the cooperative uses innovative approaches 
and regularly organizes recovery missions to collect outstanding loans. Though all this 
contributes to the “success” of the loan program, it is costly to the loan provider, raising 
the issues of providing affordable financial services to the poor and running a financially 
sustainable loan program. Mobile financial services could be a solution to cost reduction 
for a microlender such as FECECAM. 
Finally, in the fourth chapter, long-term direct benefits of loan use are analyzed. 
The chapter estimated the average causal effect of FECECAM loans on its clients’ well-
being measured by net farm income, food insecurity experience scale, food consumption 
scores, and women’s empowerment in agriculture index. These are commonly studied 
outcome variables when it comes to credit impact assessment. Here they are argued to 
pertain to longer-term effects of agricultural loans. The positive impact of loan experience 
found in the case of all studied indicators is interesting. FECECAM’s loan implementation 
and monitoring practices play undoubtedly a key role here. When agricultural loans are 
obtained and properly used for a purpose that was initially evaluated and planned, there are 
higher chances that these loans would deliver expected results such as improving income, 
which may allow to improve food security or food quality status and help gain some 
autonomy. The chapter provides a simple yet valuable lesson for future impact credit 
evaluation studies: the context of the loan program as well as the evaluation indicators are 
essential. Not detecting an effect on a specific variable does not necessarily means the 
unworthiness of microcredit in battling poverty in developing countries. 
Overall, FECECAM loan program can use some improvements. The MFI could 
better target rural female and their activities. The study shows that studied female 
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borrowers tend to move away from crop production towards value-adding activities 
(processing and trade) as their income improves. FECECAM could also improve its level 
of support to farmers by providing or facilitating their access to more technical assistance. 
More, the use of mobile technologies could help the cooperative reduce the cost of 
operation in some cases. 
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